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A method of evaluating a tax structure to determine 
the true tax burden on mining operations is presented in 
this thesis. The Liberian tax structure is used in the 
process of this evaluation. With modifications, it may 
apply to any tax structure particularly those in a 
developing country. The approach used is as follows:
1) Determination of the principle parameters in 
the tax structure which affect tax liability 
and returns on investment to the mining firms;
2) Determination of two tax measurement tools to 
assess the tax burden on mining operations;
3) Determination of financial measurement techniques 
used in the mining industry which are essential 
to investment decisions;
4) Using a sensitivity analysis to determine those
parameters which are crucial to the viability of
mining projects while providing adequate revenues 
to the government.
The major parameters of the Liberian tax structure 
which affect government revenues and returns are: 1) the
method of depreciation, 2) the royalty rate, 3) the 
depletion rate or financial reserve rate, 4) the capital 




Although most governments of developing countries tend 
to measure the tax burden on the basis of tax liability 
versus total revenue, the effective tax rate is probably 
a better measurement tool because it assesses the burden 
on the actual earning capacity of a firm. Both of these 
tools will be used in analyzing the Liberian tax structure.
The financial measurements tools used in this thesis 
to determine return on investment include: the net
present value (NPV), the Profitability index (PI) also 
known as the benefit-cost ratio and the payback period 
(PBACK)—  the time required for a firm to recoup its 
original investment capital.
Although some Governments will continue to act 
arbitrarily in modifying its tax laws to procure additional 
revenues, it is suggested by the author that some study be 
instituted to determine how any new law would effect mining 
operations. If this is not done, these governments may 
find that severe and arbitrary taxation on mines may follow 





1. INTRODUCTION ................................  1
Statement of Problem ......................  2
Scope of W o r k ........ . . . . . ........  4
2. THE LIBERIAN MINING TAX LAWS . ..............  8
Prospecting Licenses ............  9
Placer Prospecting License ..............  9
Reconnaissance Prospecting License . . . .  10
Exclusive Prospecting License ..........  10
Mining Claim Certificate ..................  12
Mining Concession ......................  . 12
Administration of Concessions ..........  14
Organization of a Mining Concession . . .  15
Capitalization Under a Mining
Concession...............................16
3. TAXATION OF A MINING CONCESSION...............18
Surface Rental ............................  18
Royalty   . . . . .  19
Corporate Income Tax .  .....................20
Scheduling and Rates................  20
Pre-Income Tax Deductibles ..............  20
Taxation on Dividends ....................  22





Depletion or Reserve Allowance ........  22
Other Exemptions from Income Tax . . . .  23
Custom Duty Benefits  ..........  24
4. EVALUATING CORPORATE TAX STRUCTURES . . . .  25
Criteria for a Mining Tax Structure . . .  25
Taxing on Commodities  ..........  25
Taxing for Revenues  ..........  26
Taxing for Economic Development . . . .  27
Criteria for a Tax B a s e .......... 30
Gross Earnings as Tax B a s e ....... 32
Net Income as Tax B a s e ........... 33
Dividends as a Tax B a s e ......... 34
Criteria for a Tax Rate  ..........  35
5. TAX MEASUREMENTS.....................  36
Effective Tax Rate Analysis . . . . . . .  36
Nominal and Effective Tax R a t e... 36
The Effects of Depletion Allowance
on ETR and TRR  ................  38
The Effects of Reverse Allowance
on ETR and TRR  ............ .. . 41
The Effective Tax Rate in Conjunction
with Royalty..........  44
The ETR in Various Tax Structures . . .  48
6. PROJECT EVALUATION IN FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT DECISIONS ....................  55





Concepts for Project Evaluation ..........  57
Annuities..............................  57
Time Value of Money....................  60
Rate of R e t u r n ........................  61
Evaluation Techniques . . . . ............. 65
Discounted Payback Period . . . . . . . .  67
Net Present Value......................  68
Profitability Index ....................  72
7. METHOD OF ANALYSIS FOR TAX EVALUATION . . . .  73
Sensitivity Analysis ................. ■. . 76
Case Studies . * ..................  78
Base C a s e ....................  78
Variations on the Base C a s e .............  78
Computer Program ........................  80
Notations..............................  82
Derivations  ..........................  84
Results..............................  85
8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS......................... 116
Overview................................116
Application of Results to the Liberian
Structure........................  117
APPENDIX.............................................119







1. Tax structure showing basic tax rates and 
capital recovery rates for a selected
number of countries........................  49
2. Annual taxation and capital redemption
for a selected number of countries.........  51
3. Comparison of tax burden for a selected 
number of countries under various
conditions of profitability ........ .. 53
4. Comparison of financial measurement
techniques........................ .. 66
5. Summary of profit and loss, 1963-1974,
Lamco.................................... . 79
6. Financial and tax measurements of the base 
case of Liberian tax structure at various 
revenue-cost ratios .................. .. 87
7. Variation on method of depreciation . . . . .  88
8. Variation on rate of r o y a l t y .........  89
9. Variation on capital structure ............. 90
10. Variation on capital recovery ............... 91





1. Effective tax rate at any reserve to
profit ratio................   42
2. Tax revenue ratio at any reserve to
profit ratio  .................... . . 43
3. Effective tax rate at any profit to gross 
income ratio for various royalty rates where 
capital recovery is from a depletion
allowance............ 45
4. Effective tax rate at any profit to gross 
income ratio for various royalty rates where 
capital recovery is from a reserve
allowance............ 47
5. Effective tax rate for selected countries
under various conditions of profitability . . 52
6. Generalized flow diagram of project evalua- 
. tion using sensitivity and probabilistic
analysis methods ............................  77
7. Generalized flow sheet of computer program . . 81
8. Inputs to computer program ................... 8 3
9. Case one: variation on method of deprecia­
tion— NPV vs T R R ......................  94
10. Case one: variation on method of deprecia­
tion— NPV vs ETR .   95
11. Case one: variation on method of deprecia­
tion— PB vs E T R .......... 96
12. Case two: variation on royalty rate--NPV
vs TRR  ........................  98
13. Case two: variation on royalty rate— NPV




14. Case two: variation on royalty rate— PB
vs ETR . ............  100
15. Case three: variation on capital structure--
NPV vs TRR  ......................  103
16. Case three: variation on capital structure—
NPV vs ETR .  ..........   104
17. Case three: variation on capital structure—
PB vs ETR  ..............................  105
18. Case four: variation on capital recovery—
NPV vs TRR  ..........     108
19. Case four: variation on capital recovery--
NPV vs E T R ................................  109
20. Case four: variation on capital recovery—
PB vs E T R ..........  110
21. Case five: variation on income tax rate—
NPV vs T R R ................................  112
22. Case five: variation on income tax rate—
NPV vs ETR  ..............  114
2 3. Case five: variation on income tax rate—




The author acknowledges with appreciation the 
counselling, contributions and advice offered, especially 
by his thesis advisor, Dr. Donald W. Gentry and other 
members of his thesis committee, Dr. Thys Johnson and 
Mr. M. J. Hrebar.
He is also grateful to the Minister of Lands and Mines 
of the Republic of Liberia and other officials of that 
Government for their assistance in providing copies of 
concession agreements and other documents related to this 
study.
Special mention go to the United Nations Development 
Programme in providing the opportunity for the author to 
continue his education at the Colorado School of Mines.
Lastly, but not least, he is particularly indebted to 
his mother, Mrs. Martha“Johnson for her encouragement and 






This thesis attempts to provide some guidelines for 
the formulation of a tax structure for mining properties 
in a developing country. The Liberian mining tax structure 
will be reviewed and analyzed to the extent that it 
promotes or impedes the development of viable mining 
projects.
A review of the tax structures of most developing 
countries show that tax policies tend to either put 
tremendous burden on the cash flows of mining corporations 
or are too favorable to the mines such that the countries 
do not realize their fair share in tax revenues. A 
progressive tax structure is one that assesses an operation 
in such a way that design parameters will not undergo 
modifications and returns on investment will be commensurate 
with risks (Lacy, 1969). At the same time the structure 
must provide sufficient revenues to meet the increasing 
demands on government. To meet both of these criteria 
through taxation is a difficult task and the ideal tax 
structure that will satisfy the taxing body and the body 
being taxed is indeed utopian. It is therefore the task 
of developing countries to formulate a structure that will
1
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meet both criteria and be least objectionable to mining 
investors should they continue to attract foreign capital.
Mine taxation policies take many forms and vary from 
country to country. The income tax remains the most 
popular form of mine taxation worldwide. The property or 
ad valorem tax, the oldest form of taxation, has lost its 
prominence since the turn of the twentieth century and has 
now become the mainstay of local governments. The excise 
and production taxes play a greater role in the tax struc­
tures of developing countries because of their simplicity 
in administering and are least susceptable to tax loopholes. 
The severance tax has gained attention because of political 
and social pressures. All of these forms of taxation, 
except the income tax seem to be aimed particularly at the 
mineral industry. It is within this light that national 
and local tax policies have become critical to investment 
decisions in an industry that is capital and risk intensive.
Statement of Problem
The world has undergone tremendous economic develop­
ment since the end of the Second World War. The demand 
and consumption of mineral resources have been at such 
escalating rates that the prophets of doom see a collapse 
of civilization in the near future from a total depletion
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of the world's mineral reserve stock. This enormous 
appetite has led the industrialized countries, particularly 
the United States and Western Europe, to look to the third 
world for a substantial portion of their raw materials.
Initially, the developing countries adopted an "open 
door" policy to encourage the exploitation of their vast 
and idle resources. They had envisioned three benefits: 
an improvement of their balance of payments; a transfer of 
technology from the developed countries which would provide 
a wealth of managerial know-how, technical expertise and 
access to international markets; and a means by which their 
economies would develop from a primary occupation that is 
essentially agricultural to one that would produce manu­
facture and consumer goods. The developing countries have 
become disillusioned in the realization of these goals and 
now tend to regard mining operators as exploiters rather 
than partners in development. They see themselves only as 
suppliers of raw materials whose prices continue to 
fluctuate whereas they must purchase consumer goods at 
prices that continue to escalate. Finally, they believe 
that mineral operations in their countries are captive of 
large multi-national corporations thus limiting the 
commodity's access to competitive markets. Because of 
these reasons and others, some developing countries have
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organized into international cartels like OPEC and ITC for 
the purpose of controlling and stabilizing prices. Others 
have resorted to higher taxation and in some cases 
nationalization.
One of the inherent problems in the formulation of a 
tax structure in a developing country is that it is often 
established on an arbitrary basis. In most cases, the tax 
bases and rates are derived directly through legislation 
without studying the implications of such taxation. Such 
formulation invariably has little or no relevance to the 
profitability or efficiency of operations.
Scope of Work
What constitutes a fair tax structure is a problem 
that faces all countries. Generally speaking, the developed 
countries tend to shift the tax burden from corporate to 
personal income. The developing countries, on the other 
hand, must rely on custom levies and corporate taxes for a 
substantial portion of their revenues. One of the striking 
features of mine taxation is the diversity of tax laws 
applied to mineral deposits and operations by various 
countries. Some see mining as a means of opening up 
inaccessible areas of the country, hence incentives are 
provided in the tax structure— specifically for mining.
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Others regard mining as an acquisition of wealth by virtue 
of blind luck and the operator should be required to share 
his good fortune with the state through heavy tax payments 
(Hansen, 1969).
The ideal basic principle in mining taxation, as far 
as the mining industry is concerned, includes the allowance 
of all expenditures, directly or indirectly, for tax 
purposes; the backward carry of all losses and tax refunds 
when operations turn unsuccessful; the disallowance of any 
tax that would raise cost of operations or affect design 
parameters; and a liberal tax free deduction policy for 
recoupment on investment and redemption of capital (Krige, 
1971). A government, on the other hand, regards an optimum 
structure as one that insures stable revenues, establishes 
sectoral equalization of the tax burden, has a minimum of 
loopholes and provides for the participation of an opera­
tion in the development of the country's economy.
It can readily be seen that to harmonize the objec­
tives of both government and the mining industry is 
monumental, if not impossible. Probably, the best approach 
in striking a balance is to formulate a structure that is 
least objectionable to both parties. It is along these 
lines that the author will try to analyze the Liberian tax 
structure.
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Chapter 2 of this thesis will discuss the present tax 
laws and regulations of Liberia. Because mining under a 
concession agreement constitutes over 95% of the mining 
activity in Liberia, the 5%. activity from small operations 
of mining claims will be considered only to give a complete 
picture of the tax structure.
Chapter 3 will review methods of taxing mining conces­
sions in Liberia and note incentives for the attraction of 
foreign capital.
Chapter 4 will discuss some approaches to the formula­
tion of a tax structure, noting the importance of the tax 
base and rate.
An analysis of the tax rate will be made to show that 
the nominal tax rate does not measure the true tax burden 
on an operation. Chapter 5 will show the derivation of 
two tax measurement tools— the effective tax rate and the 
tax-revenue ratio.
Each mine is developed and operated from a design that 
optimizes return on investment. Chapter 6 will review 
three methods used in the mining industry for measuring 
returns.
Chapter 7 will show the impact that the Liberian tax 
structure has on investment decisions. Because mining 
involves risks and is capital intensive, taxation has 
become one of the prime considerations in capital budgeting
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for new or expanding investment proposals. Investments are 
usually controlled by the capital costs and the risk-return 
trade-off. Hence, if taxation increases the financial risks 
of a project and/or lowers potential returns, this often 
provides the basis upon which a corporation may reject a 
seemingly attractive proposal.
Chapter 8 will appraise the Liberian tax structure and 




THE LIBERIAN MINING TAX LAWS
Liberia operates under a republican form of govern­
ment similar to the United States. All laws regarding 
mining are promulgated by a legislature. The implementation 
of such laws are carried out through administrative regula­
tions and specific concession agreements entered into 
between the government and mining corporations.
State ownership of minerals is provided for by legis­
lation. There is, however, a provision for certain 
substances designated as common minerals which belong to 
the owner of the land in which they occur. Such substances 
include: building stones, sand, gravel, clay and common
salt.
Since the state normally does not exploit the mineral 
itself, it may authorize interested parties to search for 
them under prospecting licenses and exploit them under 
claim titles or concession agreements.
The Ministry of Lands and Mines is the agency of 
government responsible for administering the mining laws.
All matters related to economic and fiscal policies fall 




No person shall prospect in any area for any minerals 
unless he is authorized to do so by one of the following 
licenses:
1) a valid placer prospecting license;
2) a valid reconnaissance prospecting license; and
3) a valid exclusive prospecting license.
Placer Prospecting License
A placer prospecting license is not valid beyond the 
end of the calendar year in which it was issued, provided 
that it shall cease to be valid when the holder is 
allocated a mining claim or granted location privileges.
No placer prospecting license shall be issued to a person 
who- is not a Liberian citizen of legal age and is non- 
transferable. A placer prospecting license is restricted 
to the search for placer deposits. All minerals or 
specimens of commercial value that are recovered in the 
course of prospecting shall be reported to the government 
who shall issue a permit or permits for their sale provided 
that the prescribed royalties have been paid. When the 
holder of a placer prospecting license makes a new discovery 
he may apply for location privilege and if his application 
is successful he shall be granted, on payment of the fee
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for survey and for a claim certificate, immediate permission 
to exploit such deposit. The allocation of a second claim 
on the same creek may be made if the applicant so desires 
without having obtained a second placer prospecting license.
Reconnaissance Prospecting License
A reconnaissance prospecting license shall be valid 
for an initial period of not more than two years and may 
be renewed annually provided the holder is involved in 
active prospecting. This license shall not confer any 
right to construct permanent installation or to produce 
minerals for use or sale. The existence of a reconnais­
sance license may cover any area specified by the Ministry 
of Lands and Mines but does not preclude the granting of 
another such license over the same area or any part of the 
area thereof. Any Liberian or foreigner may apply for a 
reconnaissance prospecting license.
Exclusive Prospecting License
An exclusive prospecting license shall be valid for 
an initial period of two years and may be renewed for two 
further periods of not more than one year each. The holder 
of an exclusive prospecting license may erect plant and 
machinery make trial runs of material through treatment
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plants and perform all such works and operations short of 
commercial production.
The area covered by an exclusive prospecting license 
shall not exceed 400 square miles and shall not be less 
than 5 square miles. Any Liberian or foreigner may obtain 
this license.
If the holder of an exclusive prospecting license 
prospects for and discovers an economic deposit in the 
area covered by such license, he shall have the right of 
first refusal to obtain a mining concession. However, he 
may not transfer his license or any portion of the rights 
granted thereunder without the consent of the Liberian 
Government.
The Government may attach conditions to every exclu­
sive prospecting license issued and in such conditions 
shall specify the minimum rate of expenditure of money by 
the license, the frequency and general nature of any 
reports, other than those required by the regulations to 
be submitted, and any other matters relating to the work 




A mining claim certificate is issued specifically 
for gold or diamond placer operations. No person shall 
exploit either of these two minerals except on a valid 
mining claim for which the claim certificate is made out 
in his name. A person authorized to exploit minerals may 
mine, recover, concentrate, refine or otherwise treat such 
minerals as are specified in his claim certificate.
A mining claim shall be valid for placer mining only 
and no person shall at one and the same time hold more 
than two diamond mining claims or three gold mining claims. 
A claim for gold or diamonds shall not exceed twenty five 
acres in extent and shall have such shape and dimensions 
as may be specified in the mining regulations. It shall 
be valid until the end of the calendar year in which it was 
granted or last renewed.
No foreigner shall engage in gold or diamond placer 
operations directly or indirectly except under a mining 
concession. Appendix I shows the schedule of fees and 
rents for prospecting licenses and mining claims.
Mining Concession
No person shall explore or exploit a lode or bulk 
deposit, which are the property of the state, unless he
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obtains a valid mining concession. Application for a 
concession shall be made in all respects as prescribed by 
the mining regulations of the Republic of Liberia. The 
applicant shall:
1) give particulars of the capital available for 
development of the mineral deposit, the yearly 
programs of work that would be followed, as 
nearly as possible, during the first five years 
of the concession;
2) deposit in escrow in a Liberian bank under an 
agreement a sum prescribed by the concession and 
investment commission. The said agreement shall 
provide that active work within the concession 
area shall commence within six months from the 
date of commencement of the said concession and 
money may be withdrawn from the escrow, subject 
to the approval of the Government, to make 
expenditures for salaries, payroll, equipment, 
materials, supplies and engineering services 
directly related to the determination of the 
commercial viability of the development and 
exploitation of the deposit;
3) negotiate and sign a concession agreement which 
shall explicitly define aspects of corporate 
structure, capitalization and tax structure.
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A mining concession may be granted for such period not 
exceeding thirty years or any period set by the concession 
and investment commission.
Every concession holder, whether a Liberian citizen 
or a foreigner, shall be liable to pay income tax in 
accordance with the income tax law of general applicability; 
however, the schedule of tax rates may be set by the 
concession and investment commission in the concession 
agreement in lieu of rates specified by the internal 
revenue code. Other taxation shall include, but not 
necessarily be limited to:
1) a royalty on gross sales of mining products 
the rate at which shall be established through 
negotiation;
2) surface rentals on all public land occupied by 
the concession; and
3) payment to the government of any taxes, fees, 
duties, excises or othef charges imposed by the 
Liberian laws of general application unless 
otherwise expressly provided with respect to 
the tax agreement in the concession agreement.
Administration of Concessions
The character, purpose and extent of concessions in 
Liberia was set forth in January, 1972 when a new
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administration of government came into power. A Concession
\and Investment Commission was set up for the purpose of 
coordinating concession policies and activities. The 
Commission is headed by the Minister of Finance and 
includes the Ministers of Justice; Planning and Economic 
Affairs; Lands and Mines; Commerce, Industry and Transpor­
tation; Agriculture and Labor, Youth and Sports.
The purpose of the Commission is first to review all 
existing concessional agreements, and if necessary, seek 
renegotiations to make them consistent with one another 
and. with the policies of the country. A second purpose is 
to study and implement plans for more participation by 
government in the mining industry through financing of 
infra-structure or acquisition of common stocks. A third 
purpose is to generate long range plans for subsidizing 
spin-off industries so that when the mines cease operations, 
the communities that grew around them would be self- 
sustaining. A last purpose is to seek international 
treaties with other countries for the elimination of 
double taxation on mining companies who transfer their 
earnings to their parent company abroad.
Organization of a Mining Concession
According to the mining laws of Liberia, a conces­
sionaire shall be incorporated under the laws of Liberia
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and its principle office and management shall physically 
be in Liberia. During the terms of the concession agree­
ment ,
the concessionaire shall not without the approval
of the government:
1) merge or consolidate with any other corporation;
2) sell, lease or otherwise dispose of all, or 
substantially all, of its assets;
3) acquire or maintain any property or assets 
other than those related to the conduct of its 
operations; and
4) voluntarily dissolve, liquidate or terminate 
its operation.
With respect to issue of shares of the concession 
other than those which are non-voting, 20% of each issue 
shall be offered to Liberian citizens for a period of four 
years. If, however, after one year this offer is not 
purchased, those shares may be offered to persons other 
than Liberians on terms not less favorable.
By virtue of ownership of land and minerals, the 
government reserves the right to designate minority members 
to the Board of Directors of the corporation.
Capitalization Under a Mining Concession
The concessionaire shall provide all capital at such 
time and in such manner as may be required for the economic 
and profitable development and operation of the project. 
Such capital may be in the form of paid-in capital funds 
by the concessionaire and/or in the form of long-term 
borrowings provided always:
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1) that the ratio of borrowings to equity 
capital shall guarantee the solvency of 
the concessionaire and protect the interest 
of the government and the lenders as well 
as the shareholders; and
2) that the borrowings shall be on such terms 
of amortization and repayment and at such 
effective rates of interest which are 
reasonable and appropriate under the circum­
stances then prevailing in the international 
commodity industry and in the international 
money market.
The maximum debt/equity ratio may vary depending on 
the lender, the effective rate of interest and the maturity 
dates of such borrowings. Generally, the government allows 




TAXATION OF A MINING CONCESSION 
Surface Rental
Surface rental is a cross between an ad valorem tax 
and a license tax. It can be considered a property tax 
because it is taxation on land and as such the more land 
acquired the more are the assessed taxes. On the other 
hand, it is a license tax because taxation is not based on 
the classical concept of land valuation but rather a right 
to occupy the land for a particular business. The intent 
of surface rental is to limit the extent of area acquired 
by the concessionaire and to provide a source of revenue 
to the state during the stages of exploration and develop­
ment of the mine. Rental also applies during exploitation.
Historically, the structure of the surface rental has 
varied. Originally, the intent was to promote exploration 
and as such rental on exploration areas was low. Of late, 
administrators have used this tax to discourage the 
hoarding of large land areas by making the rate on explora­
tion areas higher than on production lots.
Because all aspects of a concession agreement are 
negotiable, the surface rental rate may vary anywhere from
five cents to two dollars per acre per annum.
18
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A royalty is a continuing interest expressed as a 
percentage of the value of gross production. Its applica­
tion is independent of exploration, development and 
production costs and not influenced by profitability of 
operations. Unlike the United States, all royalties are 
paid to the government. Any privately owned land that may 
fall in a concession area is acquired through the 
government.
Royalty is paid on the selling price f.o.b. conces­
sionaire's loading port in Liberia but is deductible in 
the calculation of income taxes. Royalty may, however, be 
subordinate and junior to all prior payments which are, 
or become due, in respect of bonds, guarantee notes and 
other forms of indebtedness. In other words, royalty is 
paid only after debt related expenses have been met.
The royalty rate is a negotiable item and may, there­
fore, vary from agreement to agreement. Four percent seems 
to be the most common rate used for iron ore mines. As 
an incentive to investment, a graduated rate scale may be 
employed on a time basis such that at the end of 10 years 




According to the Liberian internal revenue code,
there shall be levied, assessed, collected and paid for
each taxable year upon the net income received or accrued
from all sources of every corporation, an income tax at
the following rates:
from $ 0.01 - $ 10,000 10%
10, 00*0.01 - 50, 000 25%
50,000.01 - 100,000 35%
over 100,000 - 45%
Income tax under a concession agreement generally
utilizes a single nominal rate of 50% in lieu of the above
schedule. In addition, mining corporations shall not be
subject to pay to the government any other taxes, fees,
duties, excises or other charges imposed by the Liberian
laws of general application, except those expressly
provided in the concession agreement.
Pre-Income Tax Deductibles
Deductions for the purpose of income tax calculations 
shall include:
1) cost of production;
2) depreciation, amortization and retirement of 
facilities computed under any of the following 
methods—
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a) straight line method,
b) declining balance method using a rate not 
exceeding twice the rate which would have 
been used under the straight line method,
c) sum-of-the-years digit method,
d) unit of production method;
3) amortization of capitalized exploration costs, 
development costs, interest during construction 
and other intangibles computed on the election 
of the unit of production method over the proven 
reserves or a straight line method over the period 
of ten years;
4) losses upon or resulting from the retirement of 
facilities through sales, abandonment or other 
means of disposition provided, however, that net 
losses incurred for any taxable year after the 
exploration period shall not extend beyond five 
years;
5) general mining and selling expenses;
6) interest expenses;
7) royalty payment; and
8) expenditure for exploration and intangible develop­
ment costs during the production phase of the
mine which shall be expensed.
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Taxation on Dividends
According to the tax laws of general application, 
dividends paid by a corporation which is a resident of 
Liberia to a foreign corporation or person shall be taxed 
15% of the gross amount.
Prior to 197 4, parent corporations participated in 
local subsidiaries by providing long term debt financing. 
The Government has now negotiated the conversion of such 
indebtedness to preferred stocks such that annual payments 
are paid in the form of dividends rather than interest.
The Government taxes such dividends on preferred stocks 
at a rate of 25%.
Incentives Under the Liberian 
Tax Structure
Depletion or Reserve Allowance
In addition to accelerated depreciation, further 
redemption of capital is permitted by means of a depletion 
allowance or a reserve allowance.
Depletion as a concept is somewhat like depreciation 
since the owner of an asset is allowed to recover his 
investment tax-free (Hague, 1970). The owner of an ore 
body has incurred costs in obtaining that asset and 
depletion deduction allow the owner of a natural resource
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asset to write off the cost of the asset against income 
earned so as to recover his investment in the asset. The 
annual allowance for depletion is equal to 11% of gross 
receipts but shall not exceed 37% of net income.
The reserve allowance is a European concept that is 
similar to the depletion allowance because it is also 
tax-free. It differs in that it is more like a sinking 
fund established for the purpose of serving as collateral 
to loans. It may also be used for capital expenditures, 
working capital and other corporate purposes. The annual 
reserve allowance is determined by the Board of Directors 
of the corporation (in which government participates) for 
the adjustment of the reserve account. This allowance is 
usually in the neighborhood of 50% of net income.
During the negotiation of a concession agreement, a 
corporation has the option of either applying for a 
depletion allowance or a reserve allowance.
Other Exemptions from Income Tax
Profits re-invested into fixed assets shall be exempt 
from income tax; exemption for re-investment into housing 
for employees, however, must receive prior approval from 
the Concession and Investment Commission.
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Custom Duty Benefits
Approved imports of machinery and equipment to be used 
in establishing the project shall be exempt from import 
duty up to 90% of the dutiable value of such imports.
This exemption, however, does not extend to include equip­
ment with less than a three-year life.
Imports of raw materials, semi-finished products and 
other supplies used in the productive operations of the 
project shall also be exempt from import duty up to 90% 
of the dutiable value of such imports.
The export of all primary mining products, such as tons 
of iron ore, are exempt from export duties.
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CHAPTER 4
EVALUATING CORPORATE TAX STRUCTURES
Criteria for a Mining Tax Structure
Taxing on Commodities
One of the rationales often promulgated by taxing 
bodies in taxing the mining industry is that the equiliza- 
tion of the tax burden should consider the unique character 
of the mineral deposit and the value of the metal contained 
therein. Hence, taxation should be by commodity. Some 
countries, and many local governments, tend to set up tax 
structures and schedules on the basis of precious mineral 
mines, metal mines and non-metal mines. Since the energy 
crisis, special tax legislations have been instituted 
against the oil and coal industries. For example, in the 
United States some states have legislated a severance tax 
specifically on coal mines because they feel that coal has 
become a more valuable commodity.
A result of a discriminatory tax structure by commodity 
is that administration becomes costly and complex-- 
especially if the mining industry is diverse. In fact, 
taxing on commodities is essentially an excise tax which 
cannot be shifted due to the fact that most mining products
25
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usually conform to a buyer's market. Taxation, therefore, 
becomes a cost item which may make an investment proposal 
less attractive.
Another disadvantage of a commodity tax structure is 
that it may affect the efficiency of operations. For 
example, a company may decide to produce a zinc concentrate 
at a lower percentage recovery and suffer penalties in 
pricing than to invest for a higher recovery which would 
increase the tax burden.
Taxing for Revenues
Hicks (1970) has suggested that the adequacy of 
revenues is the basic test of any tax. Superficially, one 
would tend to believe that this is a fair assessment of 
how a tax structure should be developed. If this is an 
accepted premise, then it should conclude that whenever 
revenues surpass expenditures in government operations, the 
surplus should revert back to the taxpayer and the tax 
system should be revised to establish the equilibrium. 
Rarely does this ever happen under any government. In 
fact, the accumulation of a surplus usually leads to the 
desire for more tax revenues as government utilizes this 
surplus to expand its activities.
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It would, therefore, seem that a tax structure tailored 
to government spending may be self-destructive because as 
government spending increase taxation on the mining 
industry actual tax revenues may reach a point of 
diminishing returns as the mines resort to selective mining 
or abandonment.
Taxing for Economic Development
Economic development has been defined in many ways by 
many persons. Meade (1955) suggests that economic develop­
ment is the increase in the total amount or value of goods 
and services produced by an economy or the total income 
received in an economy. Kindleburger (19 58) contends that 
per capita income rather than total income is a better 
measure of economic development. He notes further "only 
when we obtain more goods and services for less effort and 
sacrifice per person may we say that there has been 
economic development." Therefore, economic development 
defined in this way requires an increase in the output of 
goods and services per man-hour, rather than per person.
From the definition above. Learning (196 9) concludes 
that the task of achieving economic development may be 
divided into two basic problems. The first involves 
either the formation of, or the attraction of, sufficient
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capital to enable greater productivity on the part of 
labor and therefore higher real personal incomes. The 
second basic problem involves the efficient use of all 
available resources— land, labor and capital.
In both developed and developing countries, the 
accumulation of capital for economic development is 
definitely affected by taxation. The blunt of any tax 
structure may be either related to income or to consumption. 
If the tax structure places high emphasis on consumption, 
the result is that there is a greater propensity to save. 
Since saving is considered to be of critical importance to 
the accumulation of capital, it can be assumed that there 
is a greater formation of capital for investment. However, 
the availability of capital may not preclude economic 
development or expansion because saving has been at the 
expense of consumption. The withdrawal from consumption 
of consumer goods because of higher costs, as a result of 
higher taxation, can also have an effect on primary 
manufacture or industrial commodities.
On the other side of the coin, where taxes are 
acquired essentially from income, consumption may increase, 
because of cheaper consumer goods, as personal savings 
decline. It can, therefore, be concluded that there is 
less capital accumulated for investments. However, high
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consumption may promote economic development because there 
are more earnings available through increased consumption. 
These earnings, retained or distributed, provide capital 
for re-investment and expansion of industries. A biased 
tax structure either way influences economic growth but 
the degree is difficult to determine analytically. There­
fore, the forward shift to the consumer or the backward 
shift to the business is probably the most important factor 
in the development of a tax structure.
The developing or less industrialized nations have 
greater problems in capital accumulation. Because of low 
income and low consumption, capital attraction is more 
important than capital formation. In a great number of 
the world's less developed economies, present government 
revenues are obtained largely from those taxes which 
actually tend to have far greater effects on capital 
attraction (or retention) than upon capital formation 
(Learning, 1969). Some governments have, therefore, tried 
to attract and retain capital in their economy by 
providing tax relief and incentives where the cost of 
doing business is sufficiently reduced and the return on 
investment significantly increased. This approach may 
have two drawbacks. In the first place, revenue lost 
through these concessions may have to be acquired from
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another source, namely, consumption. High taxation against 
consumer goods may only lower the net income of people who 
are generally poor. This may have social and/or political 
ramifications. The second problem which applies specifi­
cally to the mineral industry is that businesses in the 
developing countries are usually subsidiaries of large 
multi-national corporations whose interests are spread 
globally. Such corporations tend to settle for a one- 
project approach regionally so that any increase in earnings 
are not necessarily re-invested in the local country but 
go to finance projects in another part of the world.
Criteria for a Tax Base
Seligman (1928) notes that there are thirteen methods 
of taxing corporations not counting the various combina­
tions of methods which are practiced worldwide. The bases
on which the taxes are assessed are as follows:
1) value of property,
2) cost of property,
3) capital stock at par value,
4) capital stock at market value,
5) capital stock plus bonded debt market place,
6) capital stock plus total debt both funded
and floating,





11) capital stock according to dividends,
12) net income, and
13) franchise.
The tax bases usually used for the calculation of tax 
liability against the mining industry are: value of mine
property, gross earnings (gross proceeds), net income (net 
proceeds) and dividends.
The reason used for taxation on mine property value 
is that "the tax value of a producing mine must depend upon 
the reserves of ore and the measure of salable contents in 
valuable metals" (Headington, 1969). This value is 
estimated from the total expected gross proceeds from ore 
reserves from which are deducted the expected costs of 
recovery and sale. The net value is then discounted to 
present worth. This policy of taxation is rooted in the 
philosophy that the state should be compensated for the 
removal of an irreplaceable resource, and it is within this 
framework of thought known as the "natural heritage theory" 
that taxation on mine valuation has been rationalized and 
j ustified.
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The Hoskold mine valuation premise remains a popular 
property valuation tool. This method presupposes uniform 
earnings and uniform returns on capital at a speculative 
rate and provides for redemption of capital at the expira­
tion of the operating life by uniform annual cash deposits 
into a sinking fund that will earn a relatively low, but 
safe, rate of interest (Parks, 1957). The value is deter­
mined from the Hoskold formula expressed as:
where:
V = Present Worth P
A = Annual Expected Earnings
n = Operating Life of the Mine
r = Safe Rate of Interest
r1 = Speculative Rate of Interest
Gross Earnings as Tax Base
Gross earnings is defined as gross revenues less 
royalty. Taxation on gross earnings is probably an 
improvement over taxation using the Hoskold formula. It 
is based on actual money received from sales and not on 
an "in place" value that is susceptible to change as a 
result of change in ore grade, operating cost or market
V AP r + r
(1 + r)n 1
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price. However, it possesses flaws as well— taxation is 
not proportionate to the real earning capacity of the 
corporation, it does not take into account cost of opera­
tion nor does it consider the profitability of operation. 
For example, if two mining companies received the same 
revenues in a particular year, they both pay the same 
taxes irrespective of the fact that one's production cost 
exceeded that of the other.
Net Income as Tax Base
Taxation on net income seems to be the most accepted 
form of taxes as far as the mining industry is concerned. 
Net income is gross earnings less operating costs and 
amortization. In this paper, net income will be used 
synonymously with gross profit. Although this form of 
taxation appears to be fair, it is open to tax evasion and 
loopholes. The single most important problem with taxing 
net income is defining the true net income. A company 
would like most of its costs to be expensed, capital cost 
to be depreciated on an accelerated basis over a short 
period of time, a substantial tax free deduction as 
depletion to insure the discovery of another ore deposit 
and the immediate deduction of all losses occurred in any 




be spread as far in the future as possible and expensed 
items be limited such that annual taxes do not vary 
substantially and are received as early as possible.
Dividends as a Tax Base
Any distribution made out of profits to its stock­
holders is considered to be a dividend or distributed 
profits. That portion which is retained for re-investment 
and working capital is called retained earnings or undis­
tributed profits. As the result of the gigantic growth of 
mining companies in the '50s and '60s, many countries have 
now instituted taxation on profits, retained as well as 
distributed. The reason given for taxing profits is that 
although companies are given large tax free deductions, 
their earnings are usually kept in a sinking fund or go 
to finance projects outside the country. For example, the 
United Kingdom and Italy have lowered their income tax 
rate in preference to additionally taxing profits up to 
as high as 40%.
A review of the structuring of a tax system for 
mining projects show that the general trend is to broaden 
the tax base but lower the income tax rate and/or increase 
tax free allowances for re-investment.
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Criteria for a Tax Rate
The tax rate represents the percentage of the tax 
base that must be surrendered by the taxpayer to the taxing 
body or government. A tax system usually tries to 
establish "the ability to pay concept" through a differen­
tiated or graduated tax schedule. The nominal tax rate 
is of lesser importance to the tax base because it may be 
an artificial measurement of the tax burden. For example, 
France utilizes an income tax rate of 67% but its corpora­
tions are no more severely taxed than Mexico which uses 
a 42% rate. The incidence of the corporate tax on these 
countries, as well as five others, will be shown in the 
next chapter.
Kust (1962) notes that in considering taxation on 
business, especially in looking for alternative tax 
structures, it should be kept in mind that:
1) the broader the tax base, the lower the rate 
must be thereby reducing the impact of the 
tax in business decisions;
2) that the choice of the base may make more 
certain whether the tax is shifted or 
absorbed and if shifted, that the tax will 
have less impact on business decisions; and
3) that the choice of the tax base may determine 




Whenever a tax system is evaluated, importance is 
given to the shifting of the tax between a firm and its 
buyers because the direction and degree of shift determines 
the extent to which taxation affects operations. Unlike 
the manufacture industry, shifting in mine taxation is not 
apparent. In the first place, with the exception of coal 
and oil, the cost of taxation cannot be readily passed to 
the buyers. Secondly, the sales of many primary mining 
products are covered by long term sale agreements so that 
any sudden increase in taxes would have to be absorbed as 
an additional cost of operation. This thesis will, there­
fore, use two concepts to measure the tax burden on mining 
operations: the effective tax rate (ETR) and the tax-
revenue ratio (TRR).
Effective Tax Rate Analysis
Nominal and Effective Tax Rate
The nominal rate of taxation is the statutory or 
regulatory rate provided in a tax structure. There is a 
difference of opinion as to what constitutes an effective 
tax rate (ETR). One opinion suggests that the ETR should
36
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be absolute in measuring the tax revenues in relation to 
the total earning capacity of an operation— the ratio of 
total tax revenues to the gross income of the firm. The 
other opinion is that the ETR should show the relationship 
between taxation and the true earnings of a firm--the 
ratio of tax paid to net income or gross profits. To 
illustrate the concepts, suppose there were two mining 
operations which had operating results for any year as 
follows:
Company A Company B
Gross income $5,000,000 $5,000,000
Operating costs 2,000,000 3,000,000
Depreciation 1,000,000 1,000,000
Net income 2,000,000 1,000,000
Income tax (nominal rate: 50%) 1, 000,000 500,000
The effective tax rate using the absolute approach is
calculated at 20% for company A and 10% for company B.
The ETR based on net income is 50% for both companies. If
the ETR is used as the means of comparing the tax burden
of these two companies, it can readily be seen that the
absolute approach would suggest that company A is more
severely taxed. The truth, however, is that both companies
are equally taxed because they both surrender an equal
proportion of their true earnings.
This thesis will utilize an effective tax rate, ETR,
that expresses the ratio of total tax revenue to net
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income. The ratio of total tax to the firm's gross income 
will be defined as the tax-revenue ratio, TRR. The ETR 
will be used to measure the tax burden whereas the TRR 
will determine the incidence of taxation on an operation.
The Effects of Depletion Allowance 
on ETR and TRR
The depletion allowance is a unique feature in the 
mineral industry which allows mining companies to claim a 
special deduction from income prior to the calculation of 
the income tax. The intent of this allowance is to provide 
capital recovery for mineral properties in a fashion 
similar to the depreciation allowance. Unlike the depreci­
ation allowance, depletion is usually not based on cost 
of property acquisition but rather on income. Because of 
this, some economists have regarded this type of broad 
based deduction as a tax loophole because income from 
corporate equity capital is taxed at a considerably lower 
rate in the mineral industries than it is in other 
corporate enterprises (Agria, 1969).
The mineral industry has defended its right to the 
depletion allowance on the following bases:
1) that because mineral deposits are wasting
assets there must be sufficient capital
recovery to bring new projects into
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production for the expansion of an industry 
that is of strategic importance (Krige, 1971);
2) that recoupment should be on the basis of 
developing future deposits taking into consider­
ation escalating costs and the disappearance
of high grade and/or easily located deposits 
(Gentry and O'Neil, 1974); and
3) that the capital intensive nature of mining 
projects and the high risk involved warrants 
returns commensurate with such risks (Gentry 
and O'Neil, 1974).
Following is an example of how the ETR and the TRR 
are influenced by depletion allowance. Example No. 1 
shows the cash flow for two mining operations in which 
project A is allowed no depletion whereas project B is 
allowed such an allowance. It is assumed that both 
projects are iron ore mines in Liberia which permits 
depletion allowance on the lesser of 11% on gross income 
or 37% on net income.
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Example No. 1: Cash Flow Analysis
( in million dollars)
Project A Project B
1) Gross income 5.00 5.00
2) Operating costs 2.00 2.00
3) Depreciation 1.00 1.00
4) Net income (1 minus 2 minus 3) 2.0 0 2.00
5) Depletion allowance
a) 11% of gross income - .55
b) 37% of net income - .74
6) Taxable income (4 minus 5a) 2.00 1.45
7) Income tax (50%) 1.00 .725
8) Net profit (6 minus 7) 1.00 .725
9) Cash flow (8 plus 3 plus 5a) 2.00 2.275
Calculation of ETR and TRR:
Project A
ETR = taxrevenue = KOO = >5Q Qr 5Q%







gross income 5. 00
tax revenue _ .725
net income 2. 00
tax revenue _ . 725
Project B
ETR = W  = = .36 or 36
TRR = -  = .145 or 14.5%gross income 5.00
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The Effects of Reverse Allowance 
on ETR and TRR
As mentioned previously, the reserve allowance is an 
alternative to the depletion allowance. This allowance 
which is deducted prior to taxation is determined by the 
Board of Directors of the company annually as an adjustment 
to the reserve account. Unless qualified, the term reserve 
will refer to reserve allowance in this thesis.
Since the reserve allowance is calculated as a 
percentage of net income, the ETR and TRR take a linear 













ETR = .50 (1 - ^ )P
TRR = tR . 50
TRR = .50 (P - b) =R R
P
Figure 1 shows the effective tax rate at various reserve 
to profit ratios. It can be noted here that the ETR is 
independent of the gross income. Similarly, Figure 2 shows 
the tax revenue ratio in relation to the reserve-profit 
ratio. It can be observed that where gross income equals 
net income (a hypothetical costless operation— R/P = 1)
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the TRR is the same as the ETR. As cost increases the R/P 
increases and the TRR becomes smaller in relation to 
the ETR.
The Effective Tax Rate in Conjunction 
with Royalty
Previously, it was assumed that income tax was the only 
form of taxation. If a royalty is applied against gross 
income, the whole picture of the effective tax rate is 
changed. For projects with a depletion allowance, the 
effective tax rate in percent is calculated from the 
following equation:
where:
r = royalty rate on gross 
d - depletion rate 
p = net income 
R .= gross income 
Figure 3 shows a plot of the effective tax rate for various 
rates of royalty as the profitability of operation 
increases. The following conclusions can be drawn:
1) when twice the royalty rate is equal to the
ETR 50 (1 + (2r - d)
depletion rate, the ETR is equal to the nominal
rate irrespective of profitability of operation;
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Figure 3. Effective tax rate at any profit to gross
income ratio for various royalty rates where 
capital recovery is from a depletion 
allowance.
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2) when twice the royalty rate is less than the 
depletion rate, the ETR approaches the nominal 
rate from minus infinity as a hyperbolic function 
for increasing p/R;
3) when twice the royalty rate exceeds the depletion 
rate, the ETR approaches the nominal tax rate 
from plus infinity as a hyperbolic function for 
increasing p/R ratios.
Similarly, for projects which generate internal 
financing from a reserve allowance rather than a depletion 
allowance, the ETR can be calculated from the equation:
ETR = 50 (1 - b+ ^  )
p7r
where:
b = reserve rate as a percentage of net income 
r = royalty rate on gross income 
p = net income (gross profit)
R = gross income
Figure 4 shows how the ETR is influenced by the 
royalty rate for any p/R ratio where capital recovery is 
from reserves allowance. This curve indicates that for 
high royalty rates the project is severely taxed but as 
the profitability of operation improves, the ETR is 
lowered. The interpretation drawn is that capital recovery 
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Figure 4. Effective tax rate at any profit to gross
income ratio for various royalty rates where 
capital recovery is from a reserve 
allowance.
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Derivations for the ETR equations are provided in 
Appendix II.
The ETR in Various Tax Structures
To illustrate the effects that a tax structure may 
have on the ETR, seven countries were selected on the basis 
of the differences in their tax structures. The countries 
include: United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy,
Mexico, South Africa and Liberia. Table 1 sums the 
structural characteristics and basic tax rates of the 
corporate tax applied specifically to mining. To avoid 
the complications of tax treaties among the developed 
countries (U.S., U.K., Italy and France), it is assumed 
that tax rates in those countries apply to home investments. 
In the case of the developing countries (Mexico, Liberia 
and South Africa), taxation applies to subsidiary invest­
ment from parent company abroad to which earnings are 
remitted.
To determine the ETR under various structures, a 
sample mine was chosen and assumed to operate under similar 
conditions of costs, sales and operations in the seven 
countries. A simplified income statement for the mine in 
one year is as follows:
&BTHUH BHKES EIBMH1











































































p (0 O •P rd P O
•H O 6 rd X 0) *"3 a)
<4H G W 0 P 1 a cn >
0 (0 a> a a) 0) G •» •rH Q
u -P c s > G r-H 0 0 0 G
04 g 0 0 p •3 a) •H p X 0 D
(U •H 1—1 0) 0 p 0) in aj
Xi 4J rH in ■p u c in rd CP
<D 04 C < a) a) rd 0) V) rH •H
■P p a O G p 0 Q) p
Q) c a) •H +J II &4 Q >
> o t «P G g r-H II r—1 CM CO •S’
•H 0 •H <u rd 0 aj rd u
p o > i p Oi •H •H B •H H u
p ■P o P O p -P O 2 • •
U1 <—I r—1 3 P 1—i <D 0 in G cn
•H rd (0 T3 0 (0 P r-H 0 rd w
u >1 0 04 p O 4 04 > G g
C Q 0 P X •H 0) Q) G •H Oi
M o i O4 w 04(0
u






p  o10 -H 
O P  O 10 O4 *P O o0)1 pa u a)T3





Gross income from mining 40
Operating costs 10
Depreciation/Amortization 5
Table 2 shows a summary of tax liability and capital 
redemption for the sample mine in each of the seven 
countries where the ratio of gross income to cost is 
4 (R/q = 4). To fully appreciate the significance of a 
tax structure, Figure 5 shows the incidence of corporate 
taxation for the mine under the tax systems of the 
selected countries for any R/^ between 1.25 and 4.0. If 
the ETR is used as a measurement to compare the tax burden, 
Table 3 shows the ranking of the seven tax structures 
under the following conditions of profitability: 
very high profit mines: R/^ > 3.5
high profit mines: 2.5 < R/c < 3.5
medium profit mines: 1.5 < R/^ <2.5
low profit mines: R/ <1.5
From the analyses above, several observations can be 
made regarding the incidence of taxation with respect to 
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Figure 5. Effective tax rate for selected countries 
under various conditions of profitability.
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1) for those countries which recover capital from 
net income (France, Liberia), the tax burden 
declines as profitability of operations increase;
2) for those countries which recover capital in 
relation to capital expenditure (U.K., Italy), the 
tax burden increases as profitability increases;
3) for South Africa which recovers capital from a 
statutory percentage on gross income, taxation 
progressively increases as profitability increase;
4) in the case of the United States, recovery is 
determined by selecting the smaller of 15% on 
gross income or 50% on net income. For low profit 
mines, recovery is from net income and as such 
the trend of the tax burden shows a decline as 
profitability increases. There is a point along 
the profitability range where recovery shifts to 
the calculation on gross income. When this happens, 
the trend is reversed and the tax burden begins to 
progressively increase as profitability further 
increases;
5) because Mexico maintains high taxation on gross 
income irrespective of the profitability of 
operations, capital recovery has a minimum 
influence on the tax burden. Therefore, taxation 




PROJECT EVALUATION IN FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
Background to Financial Management Decisions
Van Horne (1974) suggests that the objective of 
business should be to maximize the shareholders' wealth. 
This objective is influenced by the performance of the 
business in terms of market price per share and the debt 
financing rating of the firm because these are the means 
by which capital can be attracted and retained. Wealth 
maximization must give consideration to present as well as 
prospective future earnings per share, the timing, duration 
and risks of those earnings and other factors that bear 
on the market price of the stock. A firm, therefore, has 
three important decisions in financial management: the 
investment decision, the financing decision and the 
dividend decision.
The investment decision, perhaps probably the most 
important of the three, involves the selection of projects 
for capital commitment. The allocation of capital to one 
or several projects over others whose benefits are to be 
realized in the future require careful planning and
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unbiased financial measurements. Berry (1971) notes that 
this decision is of two types: accept-reject and ranking
alternatives. Projects are first rated according to their 
relative merit and selected on a basis which is consistent 
with the firm's objectives. For mutually exclusive 
projects, ranking is essential for selection since 
combining is not feasible.
The second decision of a firm is the financing 
decision which determines the financing mix or capital 
structure of the project. It is generally held that debt 
financing is cheaper than equity although Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) argue that the cost of capital remain 
constant throughout all degrees of leverage. Assuming that 
debt financing is cheaper, Donaldson (1961) suggests, 
however, that the degree of leverage should be determined 
by the probability of cash insolvency under the most 
adverse circumstances. In other words, sufficient equity 
should be provided for a project in order that it may 
remain solvent over its life under any condition. Further­
more, because of high risks in mining, it becomes more 
difficult and more expensive to acquire debt money. In 
many cases, debt can only be obtained if the firm is 
willing to risk its own money.
The dividend decision determines the percentage of 
earnings paid to stockholders in cash dividends, the
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stability of absolute dividends over time and the repur­
chase of stock. This decision, in effect, provides the 
firm with a policy that will expand the business through 
re-investment of retained earnings but provide acceptable 
dividends to stockholders to maintain the credibility 
of the firm. There are conflicting views on the importance 
of the dividend decision in the rating of a firm on the 
stock market. The most comprehensive argument for the 
irrelevance of dividends is by Miller and Modigliani (1961) 
who assert that the rating of a firm is determined solely 
by the earning power of the firm's assets (earnings per 
share) and that the manner in which the earnings stream is 
split between dividends and retained earnings does not 
affect that value. Gordon (1962) argues that the payment 
of current dividend resolves uncertainty in the minds of 
investors and, as such, they are indifferent between 
dividends and capital gain. In any event they prefer 
dividends. Consequently, the dividend decision has an 
important relevance to the rating of a firm on the stock 
market.
Concepts for Project Evaluation
Annuities
In evaluating mineral projects for investment, there 
are three basic requirements (Parks, 1957):
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1) the physical examination of the property in 
terms of ore reserves, optimum cut-off grade 
and plant capacity;
2) the financial examination which involves cost 
of investment and returns on investment; and
3) the risk examination which is associated with 
both the physical and financial aspects.
The first phase of the evaluation process is dependent 
upon the experience and integrity of the examining 
engineers and the thoroughness of the examination. The 
second phase involves how much can be expected from a 
project if so much is put into it. This examination can 
be made on the mathematical premise set forth to determine 
annuity values in interest calculations.
An annuity is a series of payments or receipts 
usually equal in amount made at equal intervals of time. 
Because mine planning determines uniform series of produc­
tion, annuities derived from projected sales can be 
estimated at the value of a geometric progression at 
compound interest rates (Gentry and O'Neil, 1974):
v = a ((1 + r)n -1 ) 
r (1 + r)n
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where:
V = present value 
r = rate of return 
n = life of project 
A = annuity.
For example, if planning calls for an annual production of 
five million tons of iron ore, expected annuities from 
sales can be estimated at the present selling price of the 
ore per ton. If the present value of this annuity is 
equated to the present value of all costs (V=C), the value 
r that satisfy the above equation provides a proposal's 
true rate of return— the interest received on the invest­
ment. Nonetheless, Gordon (1955) notes that the formulae 
is rarely if ever used to evaluate equipment proposals for 
two complementary reasons. First, solving the equation 
for r involves tedious trial-and-error calculations, and 
second, the range of error in the estimate of the future 
receipts is considerable.
Risk examination may alter the annuity calculated 
from certain known conditions. A change in ore grade, 
price per ton, plant capacity or operating costs may alter 
the annuity anticipated. The riskiness of an investment 
proposal is, therefore, defined as the variability of its 
possible returns (Van Horne, 1974). In the case of risk
T 1929 60
where the probabilities of a particular return is known, 
the expected annuity can be calculated from:
n
?xt' t*10 Pr°kability of occurrence of that annuity and
the expected value of the annuity in period t. The measure­
ment of dispersion or the standard deviation (a) of a 
sampling distribution is determined by:
Time Value of Money
The timing of expected cash flows is extremely 
important in management decisions. Because money is an 
instrument through which goods and services are acquired, 
the acquisition of money usually requires a cost in 
business transactions. This cost, called interest, is 
expressed as a percentage of the existing value of the 
asset per unit time. Compounding means the increase in 
value of money or an asset in the future at a rate of 
interest. Such value may be determined by P(l+r)n; where 
P is the present value of the asset, r is the rate of 
interest and n is a discrete number of time periods
A, = Y A . x P .  t xt xtx=l
where A  ̂is the annuity for the x possibility in period t,
2
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(usually in years). Discounting is basically the opposite
to compounding. A sum (P) to be received in n years can
be valued at the present as P . Thus, if an investment
(l+r)n
today can expect cash flows of A^, A2, A^, . . . An,
arising at the end of years 1, 2, 3, . . . n, the present
value of such flows can be estimated at:
n A.
PV = I  i r-
i=l (l + r)1
The future value of the project at its termination can also 
be calculated at:
n
FV = I A. (l+r) n"~1
i=l 1
Rate of Return
In project evaluation, the concept of rate of return 
is the opportunity cost of investment. The opportunity 
cost is defined as the cost of foregone investment due to 
alternate uses of resources (Weingartner, 1969). This 
cost is analogous to valuing a security in terms of its 
current prices, and is expressed as an interest rate. For 
example, a fully owned machine salable at $100,000 has an 
annual opportunity cost of $8,000 if the owner could invest 
the $100,000 in a security earning 8%, per annum. The
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longer the machine is held, the larger the opportunity cost 
assignable to the machine. If the machine is used to 
produce certain goods or services over its life, it is 
profitable to retain the machine only if returns from the 
sales of those goods and services exceed the value of the 
machine plus the cumulative annual opportunity cost.
Because benefits accrued from an investment are often 
re-invested in even more profitable ventures, there arises 
a new opportunity cost for re-investments which may vary 
from the original opportunity cost. Hence there are 
essentially two rates— the investment rate (borrowing rate) 
and the re-investment rate (lending rate). Generally, as 
in the case of this thesis, both of these rates are assumed 
to be equal.
The rate of return is probably the most important 
consideration in capital budgeting because it is used as 
a measurement to decide whether or not returns exceed the 
opportunity cost. Van Horne (1974) suggests that this rate 
is the cost of capital of a firm— the minimum rate at which 
projects are acceptable. The capital structure of the 
firm determines the cost of capital. The cost of capital 
for the various forms of capital can be determined as 
follows:
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Debt: Kd = k (1 - t)
K = cost of debt d
k = interest rate on loan
t = income tax rate
Preferred stocks: K = —
p Xo
Kp = cost of preferred stocks
I = net proceeds on stocks
D = annual dividends
D
Common stocks: = —  + g (Dividend valuation model)
pf = Po (1 - f)
K ^ = cost of equity from common stocks
D = current dividendo
P = market value of stock o
P^ = market value of stock after floatation 
charge
g = annual growth of dividends
f = floating cost or brokerage commission
expressed as a percent of the market 
value of the stocks
hkihuh m m  ehkbb
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EKee = p (Earnings per share valuation model) 
o
E = earnings per share
= market value of stocks
v ed eeJa — ----=----e 2
Kg = cost of equity (average between the two 
models)
D
Retained Earnings: K = —  + g
o
= cost of retained earnings
Dq = current dividends per share
P = market value per share o
The cost of capital is the weighted average of costs from 
all forms of financing. For example, if the capital 







the cost of capital, K (cost of capital) ~55q-“| = 11%.
The rate of return from a project should be equal to at 
least the cost of capital. Generally, 3% or 4% is added 









There are eight primary financial measurement tech­
niques in project evaluation. They include:
1) accounting rate of return;
2) payback period;
3) Hoskold method;
4) net present value;
5) profitability index;
6) internal rate of return;
7) discounted payback period; and
8) wealth growth rate.
The utilization of one or several of these techniques is 
applied to accept or reject a project or for ranking 
alternatives. Table 4 shows a tabulation of the differ­
ences of the various financial measurements. Because 
techniques 1 and 2 utilize profits rather than cash flows 
and technique 3 provides for the establishment of a 
sinking fund, these techniques do not measure the actual 
earning capacity of a firm. Technique 6 is more widely 
used in industry because a rate of return is internally 
generated independent of the cost of capital; however, 
multiple rates can be generated if there are negative cash 
flows in a stream of positive inflows. In addition, it 
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mutually exclusive projects of unequal lives (Hart, 19 71). 
Technique 8 is a relatively new technique which is still 
under study and scrutiny by industry. Therefore, the 
evaluation of projects in this thesis will be limited to 
techniques 4, 5 and 7.
Discounted Payback Period
The payback period is the time required for annual 
discounted cash inflows to equal the discounted costs of 
investment. When several alternatives are compared, the 
one having the shortest payback period would be selected 
as the "best" by this particular criterion. For accept/ 
reject analysis, the firm's maximum payback period is 
used as a hurdle for acceptance, viz the payback period 
of the project should be less than the maximum time period 
that a firm uses as the basis for recoupment of investment.
Smith (1962) notes three, criticisms with the payback 
period:
1) users tend to use shorter and shorter payback 
bases until few, if any, investment can pass 
the "test";
2) it fails to give weight to the difference in 
consequences of different investment proposals 
after the dates of payment;
3) it is biased in favor of short-lived alternatives.
Weingartner (1969) observes that academic writers have 
almost unanimously condemned use of the payback period in
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capital budgeting, yet it continues to be one of the most 
widely applied quantitative concepts in making investment 
decisions.
By definition, the payback period is determined from 
the formulae:
CPB = C = capital investment
A = annual cash flow 
Using discounted cash flows, the payback period is deter­
mined from:
PB C. PB A.I = - ^ r  - I — ^ - T  =  oi=l (l + r) i=l (l + r)
Net Present Value
Net present value expresses the difference between
the present value of all benefits and the present value of
all capital cost (outflows):
n A. n C.
NPV = I ---   — - I  - -r -
i=l ( l + r ) 1 i=l (l + r)1
where is the investment capital, A^ is the cash flow in
year i, n the life of the project and r the rate of return.
This method utilizes a rate of return that estimates 
the re-investment rate of the firm. The result indicates 
the net amount by which the firm has increased its wealth 
over the life of the project. The rationale behind the
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acceptance criterion is that since the present values of 
the benefits and costs are calculated using the company's 
required rate of return, than a project having a positive 
net present value in effect, provides the company with a 
higher rate of return on the investment capital than the 
minimum required (Gentry and O'Neil, 1974). Although the 
NPV is widely used in ranking mutually exclusive projects, 
it may be unable to rank such projects with similar net 
present values. For example, if a firm has capital to 
invest in one of two projects which have been evaluated 
as follows:
both projects are ranked similarly. If both projects have 
equal lives, it is obvious that project A should be 
selected on the basis that a smaller amount is committed 
to obtain the same net benefit. The NPV, however, is 
insensitive to a preference. The selection of one project 
over the other is not obvious if the projects have unequal 
lives. If project A has a life of 7 years and project B 
has one of 5 years, the cash flow pattern (annuities) of 
both projects are as follows:
Project A Project B
PV of costs 










C = 100m 35m 35m 35m 35m 35m 35m 35m
_  —   ̂ 3 4 ~ 5 g —
Years
PVA = 125m npva = 25m *'r = 20%)
Project B
C = 150m 59m 59m 59m 59m 59m
~0" "T 2 3 4~ 5“ (r = 20%)
Years
PVD = 175m NPVn = 25m
r> Jd
The NPV still ranks both projects equally and shows no 
preference. Although Hart (19 71) notes that the NPV lends 
itself exceedingly well to the analysis of projects of 
unequal lives, in the case of similar net present value, 
the method is inadequate. This inadequacy can only be 
eliminated if an incremental analysis is used in conjunc­
tion with an investor's minimum rate of return. The 
incremental project, project (B-A), is as follows:
Project (B-A)
C = 50m 24m 24m 24m 24m 24m -35m -35m
"1) I 2 3 4 5 6 1~
Years
If theinvestor's minimum rate of return is equivalent to 
the re-investment rate (ROR=r=20%), the projects are 
ranked similarly, as shown below:
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C (B-A) = 50m
P V ( b _ a )  = 24 x pwaf(r=20%, n=5)
- 35 x pwaf(r=20%, n=2) x pwsvf(r=20%, n=5)
PV(B-A) = 50m
NPV(B-A)= PV(B-A) “ C (B-A) = 50111 " 50m = 0
pwaf = present value annuity factor 
pwsvf = present value single value factor 
Since the incremental benefit is equal to the incremental 
cost, neither project has an advantage over the other.
On the other hand, if the minimum rate of return 
(usually the cost of capital) is less than the re-investment 
rate, assuming r = 15%:
PV(b_A) = 24 x pwaf(r=15%, n=5)
- 35 x pwaf(r=15%, n=2) x pwsvf(r=15%, n=5)
PV(B-A) = 52m 
NPV^b_A)= 52m -50m.
From the analysis above, project B has $2m advantage over 
project A, and as such project B is more profitable.
Similarly, if the minimum rate of return exceeds 20%, 
the incremental NPV for project B over project A would be 
less than 0, and as such project A would be more profitable.
{rrthur hakes eibbahu




Also known as the benefit/cost ratio, this technique 
is defined as the ratio of the present value of future 
benefits at a specified rate of return (re-investment rate) 
to the present value of all capital investment Outlays. 
Expressed mathemetically, 
n A.
£    c. = investment cost in year i
i=l (1 + r)1 1
PI =------- —=-----  A. = cash flow in year in C . i J
I — ------- -i=l (1 + r)1
The criterion for acceptance using the profitability index 
is that when PI is greater than 1, the project is accept­
able. If the PI is less than one,then the rate of return 
is less than the firms re-investment rate, and as such the 
project should be rejected. This method is actually an 
NPV alteration which gives a ratio of wealth maximization 
rather than a value maximization. The PI is probably a 
more useful tool in ranking alternative of equal lives 
than the NPV. In the example given in the previous sub­
section where the NPV for projects A and B were the same, 
the PI for project A is 1.25 whereas for project B is 1.16. 
Since project A has a higher PI it would be selected. For 




METHOD OF ANALYSIS FOR TAX EVALUATION
"The American capitalistic system is essentially a 
system of incentives, reward, punishment and efficiency" 
(Hague, 1970). At varying degrees, this is probably true 
of all systems that allow for industrial development by 
the private sector. Unlike the American tax structure 
which tries to preserve the substance of this system, 
developing countries see their tax structures as a means 
of securing maximum revenues to improve social conditions. 
The Liberian tax system is probably a hybrid of the two 
because although Liberia has modified mining regulations 
to insure greater taxation from mining companies, there 
still remains favorable conditions for the development of 
viable mining projects. The Liberian tax structure 
maintains five conditions that are explicit in concession 
agreements:
1) a minimum tax in the form of royalty and/or 
franchise;
2) the allowance for capital recovery in the form 




3) the accumulation of capital from tax-free 
earnings for re-investment and expansion of 
facilities;
4) a limitation on long-term debt financing to 
minimize interest charges; and
5) a taxation on net income at a rate of 50%.
All of these conditions are flexible and negotiable under 
the concession agreement.
This study describes a method of evaluating the 
Liberian tax structure by using the effective tax rate 
(ETR) as a measurement tool. The approach is to determine 
a base case which represents a medium profit mine under 
which the most practical case of the Liberian tax structure 
is applied. Because the objective is to measure the true 
tax burden and assess the leverage it imposes upon profit­
ability of operations, variation on the base case will be 
used to analyze the effects of the negotiable variables 
in the tax structure.
The following assumptions and simplifications have 
been made:
1) a hypothetical iron ore mine is used in which a 
feasibility study has been conducted indicating 
the most likely physical characteristics of the 
deposit--quantity and quality of reserves,
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primary processing by a washing plant, a 
realistic production rate, anticipated recovery, 
market price, required capital investment and 
anticipated operating costs;
2) the data above is used to estimate the cash 
inflows and outflows over the life of the opera­
tion and to compute returns on investment by 
three financial measurement techniques;
3) that capital recovery from depreciation and 
depletion or tax free financial reserves are 
consistent with the Liberian tax structure;
4) that any financing mix is possible— repayment of 
debt is limited to 20 years;
5) that the tax structure is consistent over the 
life of the project;
6) that the life of the mine covers only the period 
of production;
7) that total capital investment includes pre- 
production and exploration costs which are 
capitalized over the life of the mine;
8) that the market price on the ore is the f.o.b. 
price Liberia which remains constant over the 
life of the mine.
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Sensitivity Analysis
The term "deterministic" denotes values that have no 
variance in their outcome from any given situation; whereas 
"probabilistic" indicates variance in the outcome (Berry, 
1972). The analyst or decision maker can use either input 
values (with assumed certainty) with a deterministic model 
for sensitivity analysis or input probability distributions 
of random variables with a probabilistic risk analysis. 
Figure 6 shows a generalized flow diagram of project 
evaluation using sensitivity and probabilistic analysis 
methods. This thesis will use a sensitivity analysis from 
a deterministic model where single values or point estimates 
are assigned to each of the critical parameters used in the 
evaluation. Parameters of the Liberian tax structure 
which may affect profitability and thus influence invest­
ment decisions include:
1) royalty rate on gross income;
2) depreciation schedule;
3) capital recovery other than depreciation;
4) nominal income tax rate; and
5) debt/equity ratio.
It is well to mention that tax policy under the 
Liberian tax structure extends to include capital structure
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Select Parameter Values Using 
Monte Carlo Technique
Management Makes Decision 
Based on Data Resulting From 
Analysis and Judgement
Calculate Cash-Flows and Rates 
of Return Using These Parameter 
Values
Calculate Cash-Flows and Rate of 
Return Using Discounted Cash Flow 
Method
Present Rate of Return as a 
Function of Probability of 
Occurrence
Compute Single Value for Invest­
ment and Operating Cost Estimate 
Based on all Tangible Facts
Management Reviews Data Taking 
Note of Risk Indicated as 
Probability of a Particular 
Rate of Return Occurring
Present Facts as Rate of Return, 
Payback Period at Various Grades, 
Production Rates, Recoveries, 
Prices, and Project Lives
Select Probable Values for Pro­
duction Rate, Price, Sales, 
Recovery and Grade Based Upon 
Judgement and Projections
Management Review Data Taking 
Note of the Effect of Para­
meters on the Rate of Return 
and the Risk Indicated by 
Length of Payback
Compute Maximum, Minimum and Most 
Probable Values for Investment 
and Operating Cost Estimates and 
Assign Probability of Occurrence
Figure 6. Generalized flow diagram of project evaluation using sensitivity 
and probabilistic analysis methods. (From Bennett et al., USBM 
Information Circular 8495)
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because of the nature of corporate financing. In the 
United States, the ratio of funded debt to total capital­
ization has fluctuated between 8% and 30% during the 
period 1930-1968 (Hague, 1970). On the other hand, the 
Liberian experience shows the utilization of large amounts 
of loans, part of which were provided by equity holders.
The assumption of debt requires that fixed interest charges 
and principle be paid in future periods. Table 5 shows the 
summaries of profit and loss statements, 1963-1974 for 
Lamco indicating that total interest payments during that 
period amounted to $111.4 million which is equivalent to 
50% of total production cost or 17.8% of sales.
Case Studies
Base Case
A base case was developed which represents a hypo­
thetical but realistic mine in Liberia. The tax model 
used resembles very closely the one that is applied against 
Lamco, the principal iron ore mine in the country. Input 
data required for the base case is given in Appendix III.
Variations on the Base Case
Variations on the base case for sensitivity analyses 
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the Liberian tax structure as listed previously. The para­
meters were varied over their likely range of occurrence. 
Thirty-two runs in addition to the base case were performed 
by a computer program which is described below. Identifi­
cation of the runs are as follows:
run 1 - Base case
run 2 through 3 - Case One (variation on method of
depreciation)
run 4 through 10 - Case Two (variation on royalty
rate)
run 11 through 20 - Case Three (variation on capital
structure)
run 21 through 2 8 - Case Four (variation on capital
recovery)
run 2 9 through 33 - Case Five (variation on income
tax rate)
Results of the variance are tabulated and discussed later.
Computer Program
A basic Fortran IV deterministic model was developed 
by the author to calculate three financial measurements for 
the hypothetical iron ore mine: discounted payback period
(PBACK); net present value (NPV); and profitability index 
(PI). In addition, the following tax measurements were 
also determined: effective tax rate (ETR) and tax-revenue
ratio (TRR).
A generalized flow diagram of the program is shown in 
Figure 7. The model consists essentially of six segments:
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Figure 7. Generalized flow sheet of computer program.
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initialization (input data), accounting procedure (calcula­
tion of cash flows), tax accounting (calculation of tax 
revenues), financial measurement procedure (PBACK, NPV and 
PI), tax measurement procedure (ETR and TRR) and operation 
results (output). Input data required for the program is 
shown in Figure 8. The computer program is shown in 
Appendix IV.
Notations
The major factor or factors which determined the 
results of this study are given below with the appropriate 
notations:
RES - ore reserves at optimum cut-off grade
ANPRO - annual production
CIVT - capital investment
LM - life of mine
PRICE - price per ton of ore
DD - depreciation allowance annually
COST - annual operating costs
ROY - royalty tax
XINT - interest charges
DPL - reserve allowance
TAX - income tax
GREV - gross revenues
DEBT - long-term funded debt
ARTHUR CAKES LIBRARY


















Financial and Tax 
Measurement
Figure 8. Inputs to computer program. (adapted from: Johnson &
Bennet, 1969)
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EXPCT - exploration cost
TTAX - total tax revenue
GPROF - gross profit or net income
XPROF - net profit
CF - cash flow
ETR - effective tax rate
TRR - tax-revenue ratio
XNPV - net present value
PBACK - payback period
PI - profitability ratio
Derivations
The notations used in this thesis are derived as 
follows:
Life of Mine: LM = RES/ANPRO
Calculation of Annual Cash Flows:
Component Calculations
1. Gross Income ANPRO x PRICE
2. Royalty Tax GREV X RROY
3. Gross Earnings 1 minus 2
4. Operating Cost
5. Capital Expenditures
6. Net Earnings 3 minus 4 minus
7. Depreciation Allowance
8. Net Income 6 minus 7
9. Reserve Allowance
10. Taxable Income 8 minus 9
11. Income Tax
12. Net Profit 10 minus 11
13. Annual Cash Flow 12 plus 7 plus 9
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ROR = rate of return (re-investment rate or cost of capital) 
calculations of tax measurements:
ETR = .50
ETR = .50 
TTAX
1 + (2RROY - RDPL)GREV










The mathematical model used in determining the 
effective tax rate and the tax revenue ratio was tested 
with the input data for various conditions of profitability. 
A basic cost of production was estimated at $4.00 per ton 
of ore with an annual escalating cost factor of 2% over the
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life of the project. With the price per ton remaining 
constant, the basic cost was varied in increments of $0.50 
for the purpose of determining the revenue/cost factors.
Table 6 shows the financial measurements and tax 
measurements under various conditions of profitability 
for the base case. Table 7 through 11 show the sensitivity 
analysis for a single parameter variance from the base 
case at a revenue/cost ratio of 1.9 0 (a medium profit 
mine).
The overall relationship between returns on investment 
and tax burden can be shown from sensitivity graphs for 
any revenue/cost ratio. Variation on the principle para­
meters of the Liberian tax structure will be discussed 
from three such graphs:
1) NPV vs TRR
2) NPV vs ETR
3) PBACK vs ETR.
Sensitivity graphs for the profitability index (PI) will 
not be shown because they are similar to the NPV graphs. 
Tabulation of the computer print-outs which show both 
financial measurements and tax measurements is given in 
Appendix V. Below are analyses of the five case studies 
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of both tax and financial measurements from variation on 
the principle parameters of the Liberian tax structure.
Case One— Variation on Method 
of Depreciation
Incidence of Taxation (Figure 9): The incidence of
taxation (TRR) is insensitive to the method of depreciation 
irrespective of profitability of operation. This would 
indicate that government revenues over the life of any 
project is not affected by any method of depreciation, and, 
as such, restriction on the method does not improve the 
government's position in terms of tax revenue.
Tax Burden (Figures 10 and 11): Similarly, the tax
burden is not altered by a change in the depreciation 
method. Returns on investment, however, are affected by 
a change. The sum-of-year digit method is the most 
favorable method to the firm and the straight line method 
the least. It can readily be seen that high profit mines 
stand to gain substantially from accelerated depreciation 
because of the time value of money. For example, Figure 10 
shows that mines with a R/C of 3.17 increase their NPV 
by over $80 million using the sum-of-year digit method.
On the other hand, low profit mines do not show a high 
increase in value but Figure 11 indicates that the payback 
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varying the depreciation method. Therefore, the method 
of depreciation affects all types of mines.
Conclusions: From the analysis above, the conclusion
drawn is that the government should be indifferent to the 
method of depreciation irrespective of the profitability 
of operation. The reasons are obvious: firstly, the
overall tax revenue is not affected by the method and 
secondly, the tax burden is not significantly shifted as 
a result of the depreciation method.
Case Two--Variation on Royalty Rate
Incidence of Taxation (Figure 12): Figure 12 shows
that the incidence of taxation, TRR, is in direct 
proportion to the royalty rate irrespective of the profit­
ability of operations. In other words, the range of tax 
recovered by varying the royalty rate has the same net 
effect on all types of mines. However, taxation on high 
profit mines is relatively higher.
Tax Burden (Figures 13 and 14): The outcome of the
tax burden in varying the royalty rate shows a different 
result from above. The ETR for any royalty rate (other 
than 0 %) decreases asymptotically to a minimum value of 
25% (R/C approaches °°) . This indicates that the greater 
the profitability, the lower the tax burden. Most


























































































economists agree that this is an unfavorable feature in 
any tax structure. They contend that the trend should be 
reversed--the severity of the tax burden should be against 
the more profitable mines. Figure 14 shows the regressive­
ness of the royalty rate. For high profit mines, there is 
only a slight change in the payback period. On the other 
hand, low profit mines are extremely sensitive to change. 
For example, for a mine with a R/C of 1.36, if a royalty 
rate was increased from 0% to 3%, the payback period 
would increase from 11 years to 17 years.
Conclusions: From the analysis above, two general­
izations can be inferred:
1 ) the higher the royalty rate, the more government 
revenues acquired, and
2 ) taxing all operations at the same rate shows 
that low profit mines carry a higher tax burden 
than high profit mines.
It, therefore, appears to this author that the royalty 
rate should be progressive in order that low profit mines 
can become more viable at the same time high profit mines 
carry a greater tax burden. This would not affect overall 
government revenues because, where revenues are lost from 
low profit operations, they can be acquired from the more 
profitable operations.
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Case Three--Variation on Capital 
Structure
Incidence of Taxation (Figure 15): From Figure 15,
the TRR is higher for operations with low debt-equity 
ratios. This would indicate that the actual tax revenues 
received by government is lower on firms with higher 
leverage. Furthermore, the more profitable the operation, 
the more sensitive the incidence of taxation is to change 
such that any positive change in the leverage would substan­
tially lower the tax revenues.
Tax Burden (Figures 16 and 17): The acquisition of
debt financing is generally more advantageous to a firm 
because the cost of debt is cheaper than equity. This can 
readily be seen in Figures 16 and 17 where the NPV and 
payback period are more favorable to the firms with high 
leverage. In addition, those graphs infer that there is 
greater tax burden on operations with higher leverage.
Variation on the capital structure shows that the ETR 
is very sensitive to change in operations with marginal 
or low profits. On the other hand, the NPV and the payback 
are less sensitive to change. For operations that are 
progressively more profitable, the trend is reversed--ETR 
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Conclusions: Results of this analysis indicate the
following:
a) low leverage increase government revenues but 
lowers the firm's returns;
b) government revenues are more sensitive to change 
for high profit mines by varying the leverage;
c) the tax burden is very sensitive to the leverage 
for low profit mines; and
d) returns on investment are more sensitive to the 
leverage for high profit mines.
The important features of this analysis is that 
although the government would prefer a low leverage to 
maximize tax revenues, the firm would prefer as high a 
leverage as possible to maximize its returns. It would 
probably be in the government’s interest not to put any 
restriction on the leverage for low profit mines because 
such restriction could force selective mining or abandon­
ment. As a matter of fact, the leverage does not change 
the government tax revenue substantially but could increase 
the tax burden on the firm. On the other hand, it would be 
in the government's interest to restrict the leverage on 
high profit mines. As indicated earlier, unlike the United 
States where the leverage is low for mining operations, 
there is an artificial high leverage in Liberia because 
mining companies tend to consider financing from parent
COLORADO SCHOUb w  -
GOtDESi'
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company as debt money. By restricting the leverage on 
high profit mines, the government would be in a better 
position to curb this trend and at the same time increase 
its tax position.
Case Four--Variation on Capital 
Recovery
Incidence of Taxation (Figure 18): Figure 18 shows
that the incidence of taxation with respect to capital 
recovery from a reserve allowance is affected substan­
tially by the recovery rate. The higher the rate, the 
lower is government revenues. In addition, revenues are 
more sensitive to change on high profit mines which 
indicates that any change in the rate of recovery would 
bring a substantial change in government revenues. On the 
other hand, such change on low profit mines does not bring 
about any change of significant magnitude.
Tax Burden (Figures 19 and 20): It has been demon­
strated earlier that the allowance of capital recovery 
from net income is regressive because low profit mines are 
more severely taxed than high profit mines. Figures 19 
and 20 attest to this phenomenon--the ETR is higher for 
low profit mines. Another fact to be noted is that for 
variances on the recovery rate the dispersion of the pay­
back period is more spread for low profit mines but of 































































































Conclusions: The following conclusions can be drawn
from the above analysis:
a) that government revenues are greatly affected 
by a high recovery rate on high profit mines;
b) that the tax burden is high on low profit mines 
and any reduction on the recovery rate increase 
the severity of the tax burden; and
c) that the tax burden is low on high profit mines
but both the tax burden and returns on investments
are sensitive to change by varying the recovery
rate.
As a result of the sensitivity on the capital recovery, it 
would be fair to suggest that if the government continues
to allow a reserve allowance, it should be in such a way
that low profit mines would be allowed a higher recovery 
rate. Notwithstanding, the more profitable operations 
should be subjected to higher taxation by lowering the 
recovery rate.
Case Five— Variation on Income 
Tax Rate
Incidence of Taxation (Figure 21): According to
Figure 21, any change in the income tax rate does not 
significantly change the TRR for low profit mines.
Following the general trend of the other case studies, 
the incidence to taxation on high profit mines is more 







Tax Burden (Figures 22 and 2 3): As far as the ETR
is concerned, with all other factors remaining constant 
on the base case, even at 50% income tax rate, low profit 
mines are severely taxed. Any small positive change in 
the rate increases the tax burden exponentially. With 
respect to returns, the sensitivity of the payback period 
as shown in Figure 2 3, is probably a better indication of 
the effects that such a change would have on operations. 
For example, if a mine with a R/C of 1.36 was taxed at a 
rate of 40% and this rate was increased to 50% the payback 
period would have increased by an additional 4 years.
On the other hand, a change in the income tax rate 
on high profit mines does not change the tax burden as 
significantly as on low profit mines.
Conclusions: By and large, because the government
imposes a royalty on mines, any change in the income tax 
rate can be expected to be modest. It should be noted, 
however, that should the royalty play a lesser role in 
the Liberian tax structure, granted that capital recovery 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Overview
This study was conducted by the author to determine 
the true tax burden that mining taxation imposes on mining 
operations in Liberia. Since the author has worked with 
the Liberian Government, he is fully aware of the problems 
involved in determining the tax base and tax rate for an 
industry that is capital as well as risk intensive. As a 
result, taxation invariably is decided through negotiations.
As indicated earlier, the author feels that a fair tax 
structure is one that is least objectionable to the 
government as well as the mining firm. Expressing this 
explicitly, a tax structure should not modify design para­
meters, but it should be progressive such that more 
profitable operations bear a greater burden of taxation.
Two tax measurement tools were used in assessing the 
Liberian tax structure--the tax revenue ratio and the 
effective tax rate (ETR). The TRR measure taxation in 
relation to the total earning capacity of the operation.




The financial measurements used in determining returns 
on investments are the net present value (NPV); the 
profitability index (PI) and the payback period (PI).
Application of Results to the Liberian
Structure
Generally speaking, the Liberian tax structure is 
regressive because of the following reasons:
1 ) high profit mines are taxed proportionately at
a lower rate than low profit mines;
2 ) taxation on mines are not consistent among the
various operations because each mine operates 
under a different tax structure which is deter­
mined through negotiations;
3) capital recovery from a reserve allowance is an 
artificial deduction because a substantial portion 
of this tax-free deduction is really earnings. 
Furthermore, this financial reserve is not fixed
but is determined on a year-to-year basis by a
Board of Directors that does not have equal 
representation between the government and the 
company;
4) the allowable debt-equity ratio is too high and 
has been used as a means of tax avoidance.
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The use of a sensitivity analysis from a deter­
ministic model shows that the effective tax rate (ETR) is 
most sensitive to three parameters in the Liberian tax 
structure: the royalty rate, the capital structure and
the reserve allowance. Since it is government's policy 
to maintain a minimum tax through a royalty, it can be 
concluded that the royalty tax will be applied against 
mining operations. However, the royalty rate should be 
kept at a minimum. It is the opinion of the author that 
the royalty rate should be progressive in relation to the 
profitability of operations. For low profit mines, a 1% 
to 2% rate should be used; for moderate profit mines a 3% 
to 4% rate; and for high profit mines a 5% to 6 % rate 
should apply. There should be a greater limitation on the 
debt-equity ratio— probably a 1:1 or 2:1 maximum. The 
reserve allowance should be abolished in preference to a 
statutory depletion allowance. Other incentives like duty 
free privileges and the elimination of other excises and 





Schedule of Fees and Rents per annum, on a pro­
rata basis, for Prospecting Licenses and Mining 
Claim Certificate*
Placer mining claim, not including diamonds $ 100.00
Placer prospecting license for minerals 
including gold and diamonds
Place mining claim for diamonds
License for diamond broker
License to purchase and export diamonds
Reconnaissance prospecting license
Exclusive prospecting licenses:
For the first 5 square miles or part thereof 50.00 
For the second 5 square miles or part thereof 50.00 
For the second 10 square miles or part thereof 70.00 
For the third 10 square miles or part thereof 50.00 
For the fourth 10 square miles or part thereof 40.00 
For the fifth 10 square miles or part thereof 30.00 
For each subsequent area of 10 square miles
or part thereof 20.00
*Source: Republic of Liberia, The Mining Regulations,









Derivation of Effective Tax Rate Equations 
Tax liability = r%R + 50%(P - d%R)
Effective Tax Rate =
ETR(%) = r%R + 50% (P - d%R)
—  p -f ^ rp _ ^ p\100 100 1 100 ;




=50 (1 +5 OP 100P
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Tax liability = r%R + 50%P(1 - b)
r  r  +  | 0 P  (1 _ b)
ETR = — --------    x 100
rR + 5OP (1 - b)
50 (1 - b +5^| )
=50 (1 - b + f£fp





ETR = EFFECTIVE TAX RATE 
P = GROSS PROFIT 
R = REVENUE 
r = ROYALTY RATE 
d = DEPLETION ALLOWANCE 
b = RESERVE ALLOWANCE
From: Krige, 1971
ARTHUR CAKES HBMR^




SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS BASE CASE INPUT DATA
1. Annual Production: 10,000,000 short tons of washed
lumps
2. Reserves: 2 50,000,000 short tons of proven reserves
3. Investment statistics:'
A) Exploration cost: $20,000,000
B) Capital investment: $150,000,000
C) Replacement investment: 10% of net income annually
4. Ore price: $12.00/ton - no change in price over the 
life of project
5. Operating costs:
A) Basic cost per ton in year 1: $4.00
B) Escalating cost factor annually: 2% increase over
preceding year
6 . Capital Recovery:
A) Depreciation: Double declining balance with switch
to straight line when applicable
B) Reserve allowance: 50% of net income
7. Capital structure:
A) Debt/Equity ratio: 1:1
B) Retirement of debt limited to 20 years
8 . Taxation:
A) Royalty rate: 4% of gross income
B) income tax rate: 50% of taxable income
123
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9. Cost of capital:
Cost of debt: 12%
Cost of equity: 20%
Re-investment rate (cost of capital): 





type libn.f4 C 21:53!561!  00100 C THIS IS A PROGRAM TO EVALUATE THE LIBERIAN TAX00200 C STRUCTURE USING A SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
00300 C
00400 C
00500 C ******** DEFINITIONS ********
00600 C
00700 c XLM LIFE OF MINE
00800 c RES RESERVES
00900 c ANPRO ANNUAL PRODUCTION
01000 c Cl VT CAPITAL INVESTMENT
01100 c GREV ANNUAL REVENUES
01200 c PRICE PRICE OF ORE
01300 c DD(K> DEPRECIATION DEDUCTION
01400 c DPL(K ) ANNUAL DEPLETION OR FINANCIAL RESERVES
01500 c X INT < K ) INTEREST ON INDEBTEDNESS
01600 c GPROF(K) - TAXABLE INCOME
01700 c ROY(K) ROYALTY
01800 c EXPCT EXPLORATION COST
01900 c RIVT REPLACEMENT INVESTMENT
02000 c NPROF NET PROFIT
02100 c CF (K ) CASH FLOW
02200 c ETR EFFECTIVE TAX RATE
02300 c TBR TAX BASE RATIO
02400 c XNPV NET PRESENT VALUE
02500 c PP PAYBACK PERIOD
02600 c PI PROFITABILITY INDEX
02700 c IRR INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN
02800 c WGR WEALTH GROWTH RATE
02900 c
03000 c
03100 DIMENSION MD(33)rRROY < 33)rRDEBT(33> rRDPL<33)rCOST(30)
03200 1 R0Y<33)rXNREV<33> r EARN(30)»XINT(30)rTDPR<30>r
03300 2 DPL (30) r DD (30) r GF’ROF (30) r XPROF (30) rTAX (30) r TTAX (30 > r.
03400 3 CF(30 > r UIVT(30) rXNPV< 30)rCMCF(30)rPMCF < 30)r RTAX(33)r
03500 4 BCPT<10)
03600 c
03700 DATA(MD<I)rI"1r 33)/-lfOr1r — 1r-1r — 1f—1r —1r — 1r — 1r — 1r
03800 1 -1r-1r-1r-1r 1H1IH1H1HiwiHiH1tW1H!
03900 - I f  If— 1 r — 1 r— 1 f —
;;c t y :
<1 /
- 'LOWER RATES' START IN 5 MIN.
1 /
04000 DATA(RROY ( I> r1=1r33)/.04r.04r.04r0.0r.01r.02r.03r.05r
04100 1 .07 r.04 r *04 r♦ 04r.04r.04r.04r «04r.04r «04r *04r.04r.04r
04200 2 .04r.04f.04r . 04 r.04 r.04 r.04 r.04 r . 04 r . 04 r.04/
04300 DATA(RDEBT ( I>rl=lr33>/.5r.5r.5r.5r.5r.5r.5r.5r.5r.5r0
04400 1 , 167 r . 2 r.25 r . 333r.667 r.75 r.8 r . 833r1.Or.5r.5r.5f.5r.5r
0 4500 2 . 5 > . 5 r ♦ 5 r ♦ 5 r• 5r.5 r.5 r.5/
04600 DATA ( RDPL ( I> rl=lr33)/.5r,5r,5r.5r.5r.5r.5r.5r,5r.5r
04700 1 ♦5f.5f.5r.5f
04800 2 .8 r .Hr • 5 r .5 f.5r.5r.5r.5/
04900 DATA(RTAX<I ) fl=lf33)/.5r.5r.5r.5r.5r.5r.5r.5r.5r.5r
05000 1 ♦ 5r.5r.5 r . 5 r.5f,5f.5f.5r.5f.5r.5f.5f.5r.5r.5r.5r
05100 .5 r.35 r. 40 r .45 r * 55 r . 60 r » 65/
05200 DATA EXF r PRICEr CIVT rANPRO r RES/0.02r12.00»
05300 1 1 ♦5E+8 r1.0EF7r2.5E+8/
05400 DATA EXPCTrRINTrCTDBrCTEG/2.OE+7r.10r.12r.20/
05500 DATA AA/'DOUBL'/fAB/'E DEC'/rAC/'LININ'/rAD/'G BAL'/r
05600 1 AE/'ANCE'/rAF/'STRAI'/rAG/'GFT L'/rAH/'INE M'/
05700 2 AI/'ETHOD'/rAJ/' '/fAK/'SUM O'/rAL/'F YEA'-
05800 3 AM/'IR DIG'/rAN/'IT ME'/rAO/'THOD '/rAP/'ALL D
05900 5 AQ/'EBT '/rAR/'ALL E '/rAS/'QUITY'/r
06000 6 AT/'OF GR'/rAU/'OSS I'/rAV/'NCOME'/rAW/'OF NE'-
125





06600 L_M=IF IX (XLM)
06700 GREV=ANPRO*PRICE
06800 C
06900 C **********WRITE HEADINGS
07000 C
071 (>0 C WRITE (6 ,2001)
07200 DO 799 1=1,33















08800 IFd.EQ.21 ) WRITE (4,2006)
08900 IF(I.EQ.28)WRITE(4,2007)
09000 C





























12100 32 IF(I.EQ.1)WRITE (4,2008)ANPRO,LM,CIVT,PRICE,XA,XB,XC,
12200 1 XD,XE,ROYRT,DEPRT,XF,XG,XH
12300 IF(RDEBT(I).LT.1,0.AND.RDEBT(I).GT .0.0)GO TO 5012400 IF(RDEBT(I),EQ.0.0)G0 TO 45
12500 Y I=AP
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12700 GO TO 48
12800 45 YI=AR
12900 Y J=AS
13000 48 IF(I.EQ.l) WRITE (4 » 2009)YI* YJ * RT AX(I)
13100 GO TO 52
13200 50 DBEQ=RDEBT(I)/<1.O-RDEBT <I))
13300 IF(I.EQ * 1) WRITE (4»2010)DBEQrRTAX(I)
13400 C
13500 52 IF (I . GT . 1 . AND , I . L_T . 4 ) WRITE < 4 » 2018 ) XA r XB ? XC r XD
1.3A00 IF(I♦GT,3.AND 4 I»LT.11)WRITE(4 » 2019)
13700 1R0YRT
13800 IF(I.LT.11,OR.I.GT.20)GO TO 130
13900 IF ( RDEBT ( I ) 4 L.T 4 1 4 0 4 AND 4 RDEBT (I) 4 GT 4 0 ♦ 0 )G0 TO :
14000 WRITE(4r2020)YI»Y J
14100 120 WRITE(4 r 2021)DBEQ
14200 130 IF(I,GT.20,AND * I.LT,28>WRITE(4»2022>DEPRT
14300 IF(I.GT.27)WRITE(4 r 2023)RTAX(I)
14 400 C
1 4500 CF'T-2 .50








15400 DO 580 K=1rLM ,
15500 XK=FLOAT<K)
15600 COST < K > =ANPRO#(BCPT(N )* <1.O+EXFfcXK))




16100 C * * * * * * .it # * 11 ♦ ♦ * % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % * ♦ * * % * * ♦ #
16200 c:









.17200 IF(K-1TEST)250 r 220 > 220
17300 220 U“CIVT *((1,0-2.00/XLM>**(ITEST-1>)
17400 DD (K ) r-U/ (XLM-FLOAT< ITESTJ + l .0)
17500 XJ=XJf1,0
17600 UIVT(K)-U-DD < K)#X J
17700 250 GO TO 550
.1.7800 C
17900 C STRAIGHT LINE METHOD
18000 c
18.100 300 DD ( K ) :=CI VT/XLM
.1 8200 UIVT(K)-DD(K)# <XLM-XK)
:l. 8300 350 GO TO 550
1 84 00 C
1 8500 c: DOUBLE DECLINING BALANCE METHOD
18600 c
18700 400 DD(K )~CIVT#(< 2.0#(XLM-XK +1.0))/(XLM*(XLM18800 1 +1.0 )))




19400 C ********** CALCULATE CASH FLOW ************
19500 C
19600 550 IF<RDPL(I).EQ..11)DPL < K )=GREV*RDPL(I)
19700 IF(RDPL(I).GT..11)DPL < K ) = < EARN(K )-DD(K ))*
19800 1 RDPL <I)
19900 EXPDR=(EXPCT/RES)*ANPRO
20000 TDPR(K )=DD(K )+EXPDR
20100 GPROF(K )=EARN < K )-< DD(K )+DPL(K )+XINT < K )+EXPDR)
20200 RIVT=GPROF <K)*«10
20300 TAX(K ) = (GPROF(K )-RIVT)*RTAX <I)
20400 IF(TAX(K ).LT.0.0)TAX(K )=0.0
20500 XPROF(K )-GPROF(K )-TAX(K )
20600 TTAX(K )=TAX(K )+R0Y(I)
20700 CF < K )=XPR0F(K )+DPL(K )+TDPR(K )
20800 G





21400 1 /< RDEBT <I) + (1.O-RDEBT(I)))
21500 PUMCF=PUMCF +(CF(K )/(1+ROR)**K)
21600 TIVT=CIVT+EXPCT
21700 PMCF < K )=PUMCF
21800 CUMTX=CUMTX+TTAX < K )
21900 CUMGP=CUMGP+< EARN(K )-DD <K)-XINT<K))
22000 CUMGR=CUMGR+GREV
22100 CUMCT=CUMC'T+COST< K )
22200 C
22300 C ********** CALCULARE RATE AND LEVEL OF TAXATION ****
22400 C
22500 IF (RDPL (I) . EQ. . 11 )ETR,aRTAX (I) * (1 . 0
22600 1 + < < 2.0*RR0Y(I)-RDPL <I))*CUMGR)/CUMGP)
22700 .IF (RDPL (I >♦NE♦.11 >ETR“RTAX < I > * < 1 ♦ 0-
22800 1 RDPL<I)) + <RROY(I)*CUMGR)/CUMGP
22900 TBR=CUMTX/CUMGR
23000 XNPV < K ) =PUMCF-TIVT
23100 YNPV=XNPV < K )
23200 C
23300 C
iiCTY{ - "LOWER RATES' HAVE STARTED.
********** CALCULATE PROFITABILITY INDEX **********
23400 C
23500 PI=PUMCF/TIVT





24100 C ********** CALCULATE PAYBACK PERIOD **********
24200 C
PBAfcK=XM+(< 0.0-XNPV< M ))/(XNPV(M+1)-XNPV < M )))24300
24400 C




24900 C DO 679 L-lr1000
25000 C XPV=0.0
25100 C XIRR=XIRR+•001
25200 c DO 659 K=1rLM









































































IF < DCNPV)68? , 689 ,679 
CONTINUE






DO 695 K=1 ,L.M







********WRITE COSTS AND CAPITAL RECOVERY **********
WRITE (6,2011)
DO 705 K=1,LM
WRITE <6 ,2012)K ,TDPR< K ),DPL <K ),COST< K ),XINT < K )
,ROY<I),TAX<K ),TTAX(K )
CONTINUE











FORMAT(1H,//////////,46X,'EVALUATION OF LIBER 
IAN TAX STRUCTURE' »/////64X,7 BY7,/////56X,'JAHMALE C.
JOHNSON',/////53X,'COLORADO SCHOOL OF MINES',/////57X, 
'GOLDEN, COLORADO')
FORMAT (1H1,//10X,'BASE CASE - PRACTICAL CASE 
OF LIBERIAN TAX STRUCTURE'/)
FORMAT (1H1,//10X,'CASE ONE - VARIATION IN 
METHOD OF DEPRECIATION'/)
FORMAT (1H1,//10X,'CASE TWO - VARIATION IN 
RATE OF ROYALTY'/)
FORMAT (1H1,//10X,'CASE THREE - VARIATION IN 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE'/)
FORMAT (1H1‘,//10X, 'CASE FOUR - VARIATION IN 
CAPITAL RECOVERY')
FORMAT (1H1,//10X,'CASE FIVE - VARIATION IN 
INCOME TAX RATE'/)
FORMAT (1H,//2X,'ANNUAL PRODUCTIONJ',F14.2,
' TONS',4X,'LIFE OF MINE!',14,' YRS',//2X,'CAPITAL 
INVESTMENT: *',F14.2,4X,'ORE PRICE: *',F5.2,//2X, 
'DEPRECIATION METHOD: ',5A5,4X,'ROYALTY RATE: ',F5.2,







32300 ITION COSTS'*22X*'GOVERNMENT TAXATION'//*' PR0J'*40X
32400 2.'OPERATING'*8X r'INTEREST'/*' YEAR' » 5X *'DEPRECIATION'
32500 35X*'DEPLETION'*1IX*'COSTS'*11X»'CHARGES'*11X*
32600 4'ROYALTY'*5X*'INCOME TAX'*6X*'TOTAL TAXES'/>
32700 2012 FORMAT(1H ,I3*F18.2*F15.2*F18.2»F17.2*F18.2*
32800 1 F14.2*F16.2>
32900 2013 FORMAT<1H*//' PROJ'*8X*'GROSS'*11X»'NET'»10X*'
33000 1TAXABLE'»10X*'NET'*23X»'CUMULATIVE'*3X*'PRESENT
33100 2 VALUE'*4X*'NET PRESENT'*/' YEAR'*7X*'INCOME'*9X*
33200 3'INCOME'*9X*'INCOME'»9X*'PROFITS'»7X»'CASH FLOW'*
33300 45X*'CASH FLOW'»4X*'CUM.CASH FLOW'*6X*'VALUE'>
33400 2014 FORMAT <1H *I3*F17.2*7F15.2>
33500 2015 FORMAT <1H*//20X*'PAYBACK PERIOD:'»F6 .2*33600 1/20X*'PROFITABILITY INDEXt'*F6 .2*/20X*
33700 2/DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW RATE OF RETURN:'*
33800 3F6.2*/20X*'WEALTH GROWTH RATE:'*F6.2*
33900 4//20X*'EFFECTIVE TAX RATE:'*F6 .2*
34000 5/20X*'TAX BASE RATIO:'*F6.3)
34100 2016 FORMAT <1H *F6.2*2X*F15.2*2X*2F8.2*2F8.3>
34200 2017 FORMAT (1H » 3X *'R/C'* 9X *'NPV'*12X*'PI'*4X*'PBACK
34300 14X*'ETR'*5X»'TRR'/*4X*'___'*9X*'___'*12X*'__'*4X*'___
34400 24X * '___'»5X * '___ ')
34500 2018 FORMAT < 1H */'DEPRECIATION METHOD*. ' *5A5)
34600 2019 FORMAT (1H */5X*'ROYALTY RATE: '*F5.2*' X')
34700 2020 FORMAT (1H */5X*'DEBT/EQUITY RATIO.* '*2A5>
34800 2021 FORMAT (1H */5X*'DEBT/EQUITY RATIO: '*F5.2>
34900 2022 FORMAT (1H */5X*'DEPLETION/RESERVE :'*F5.2*
35000 1' %' )









EVALUATION OF LIBERIAN TAX STRUCTURE
BY
JAHMALE C. JOHNSON
COLORADO SCHOOL OF MINES
GOLDEN* COLORADO
BASE CASE - PRACTICAL CASE OF LIBERIAN TAX STRUCTURE
ANNUAL PRODUCTION? lOOOOOOO.00 TONS LIFE OF MINE: 25 YRS
CAPITAL INVESTMENT? $ 150000000.00 ORE PRICE: $12.00
DEPRECIATION METHOD.' DOUBLE DECLINING BALANCE ROYALTY RATE:
DEPLETION/RESERVE ALLOWANCE: 50.00 XOF NET INCOME
DEBT/EQUITY RATIO'. 1.00 INCOME TAX RATE: 0.50
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3Tl7 209255492.00 2.23 3.75 0.320 0.159
2.72 186974740.00 2.10 3.94 0.327 0.149
2.38 160218976.00 1.94 4.37 0.336 0.137
2.12 133463196.00 1.79 4.88 0.347 0.125
1.90 106707420.00 1.63 5.57 0,361 0.113
1.73 79951636.00 1.47 6.51 0.379 0.101
1.59 53195860.00 1.31 7.93 0.406 0.090
1 .47 26440084.00 1.16 10.62 0.446 0.078
1.36 -315698.00 1.00 26.00 0.513 0.066




CASE ONE - VARIATION IN METHOD OF DEPRECIATION
DEPRECIATION m e t h o d : s t r a i g f t LINE METHOD
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3*17 206101156,00 2.21 3.83 0.320 0.159
2»72 183790436.00 2.08 4.04 0.327 0.1492.38 157034652.00 1.92 4.49 0.336 0.137
2.12 130278876.00 1.77 5.02 0.347 0.125
1.90 103523100.00 1.61 5.75 0,361 0.113
1.73 76767322.00 1 .45 6.76 0.379 0.101
1 .59 50011542.00 1 .29 8.33 0.406 0.090
1.47 23255766.00 1.14 11 .34 0,446 0.078
1 .36 -3500010.00 0.98 26.00 0.513 0.066
1 *27 -30321984.00 0.82 26.00 0.653 0.055
d e p r e c i a t i o n m e t h o d : s u m o f y e a r d i g i t m e t h o d
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3717 2ioiiiii6 .oo 2,24 ”5775 0.320 o7l59
2.72 187828068.00 2.10 3.94 0.327 0. 149
2.38 161072296.00 1 .95 4.36 0.336 0.137
2.12 134316516.00 1.79 4.87 0.347 0.125
1.90 107560736.00 1 .63 5.55 0.361 0.113
1 .73 80804956.00 1.48 6.48 0.379 0.101
1 .59 54049182.00 1.32 7.88 0.406 0.090
1 .47 27293406.00 1.16 10.47 0.446 0.078
1 .36 537630.00 1.00 22.83 0.513 0.066
1,27 -26218148.00 0,85 26.00 0.653 0.054
CASE TWO VARIATION IN RATE OF ROYALTY
ROYALTY RATE! 0.00 X
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3~17 231966660.00 2.36 '5745 07250 o7l 28
2.72 209655932.00 2,23 3.65 0.250 0.118
2.38 182900160.00 2.08 3.97 0.250 0.106
2.12 156144376.00 1.92 4,41 0.250 0.094
1.90 129388604.00 1.76 4.93 0.250 0.082
1.73 102632824,00 1,60 5.64 0.250 0.070
1.59 75877042.00 1.45 6.62 0.250 0.059
1 .47 49121268.00 1.29 8.14 0.250 0.047
1 .36 22365490.00 1.13 11.12 0.250 0.035
1 .27 -4390286.00 0.97 26.00 0.250 0.023
ROYALTY RATE: 1 .00 7.
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3. 1. 7 226296372.00 2.33 3.54 0.267 0.136-7,72 203985640.00 2.20 3.72 0.268 0.125
T 192 9 133
2.38 177229868.00 2.04 4.06 0.270 0.114
2.12 150474080.00 1 .89 4.52 0.273 0.102
1 .90 123718308.00 1 .73 5.07 0.276 0.090
1 .73 96962528.00 1 .57 5.82 0,279 0.078
1 .59 70206750.00 1.41 6.89 0.285 0.066
1 .47 43450974.00 1 .26 8.62 0.293 0.055
1 .36 16695192.00 1 . 10 12.32 0.305 0.043
1 .27 -10060592.00 0.94 26.00 0.327 0.031
ROYALTY RATE: 2.00 %
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3.17 220626072.00 2.30 3.61 0.284 0. 1442 7^ 1.98315332,00 2.17 3.79 0. 287 0. 133
2.38 171559568.00 2.01 4. 16 0.291 0. 121
2.12 144803780.00 1 .85 4.63 0,296 0. 110
1 .90 118048012.00 1 .69 5.23 0.302 0.098
1 . 73 91292230.00 1 .54 6.02 0.311 0.086
1 .59 64536458.00 1 .38 7.20 0.322 0.074
1 . 47 37780676.00 1,22 9.16 0.339 0.062
1 .36 11024900.00 1 .06 13.99 0.366 0.050
1 .27 -15734894.00 0.91 26.00 0.418 0.039
ROYALTY RATE: 3.00
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3.17 214955776.00 2. 26 3.68 0.302 0.151
'P 72 192645040.00 2.13 3.86 0.307 0.141
2.38 165889268.00 1 .98 4,26 0.313 0. 129
2.12 139133492.00 1 .82 4.75 0,321 0.117
1 .90 112377716.00 1 .66 5.39 0.331 0. 105
1 .73 85621930,00 1 .50 6.26 0.344 0.094
1 .59 58866158.00 1 .35 7.56 0.362 0.082
1.47 32110378.00 1 . 19 9.82 0.390 0.070
1 .36 5354602.00 1 , 03 16.80 0.435 0. 058
1 .27 -21414524.00 0.8 7 26. 00 0.52 4 0.047
ROYALTY RATE: 5.00
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR IRR
3Tl7 203615188.00 2720 ~5782 07339 o7167
2.72 181304448.00 2.07 4.03 0.348 0.156
2,38 154548684.00 1.91 4.48 0.359 0. 145T . 127792900.00 1 .75 5.00 0.374 0. 133
1 . 90 101037124.00 1 .59 5.75 0.392 0. 121
1 .73 74281344.00 1 .44 6.77 0.417 0. 109
1 .59 47525568.00 1 .28 8.38 0.453 0.097
1 .47 20769786.00 1 .12 11.61 0,507 0.086
1 .36 -5985990.00 0.96 26.00 0.602 0,074
1 ,27 -32793490,00 0.81 26.00 0.809 0.063
ROYALTY RATE: 6.00 %
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3 . J. 7 197944892.00 2 . 16 3.89 0. 359 0. 175
2. 72 175634160.00 2.03 4.12 0,370 0. 164
2. 38 148878372.00 1 .88 4 .59 0.384 0. 152
2.12 122122604.00 1 .72 5.16 0.402 0.141
1 .90 95366826.00 1 .56 5.93 0. 426 0. 129
1 . 73 68611048.00 1 . 40 7.05 0.457 0.117
1 , 59 41855270.00 1 .25 8.88 0.503 0, 105
1 . 47 15099490.00 1 .09 12.93 0.575 0.093
1 .36 -11656286.00 0.93 26.00 0, 705 0.081
.1 .27 -38495777.00 0.77 26.00 1 .006 0.071
ROYALTY RATE: 7.00 %
T 1929 134
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3.17 192274596.00 2.13 3.97 0.380 0.182
2.72 169963856.00 2.00 4.22 0.393 0,172
2.38 143208076.00 1.84 4,71 0.410 0.1602.12 116452312.00 1.69 5.32 0.432 0,1481 .90 89696528.00 1 .53 6.15 0.461 0, 136
1 .73 62940752.00 1 .37 7.39 0.501 0. 125
1,59 36184970.00 1.21 9.48 0.559 0,113
1.47 9429196,00 1 .06 14,87 0.651 0.101
1 .36 -17326582.00 0.90 26.00 0.824 0.089
1 .27 -44206797.00 0.74 26.00 1.259 0.079
CASE THREE - VARIATION IN CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
DEBT/EQUITY RATIO! ALL EQUITY
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3.17 155008564.00 1.91 3.83 0.317 0.171
2,72 133637588.00 1.79 4.20 0.324 0.159
2♦ 38 112266604.00 1.66 4.67 0.332 0.1472.12 90895630.00 1 ,53 5.26 0.341 0.135
1 .90 69524648,00 1 .41 6.06 0.354 0.124
1 .73 48153676.00 1.28 7.26 0.370 0.112
1 .59 26782696.00 1.16 9.30 0.393 0. 100
1 .47 5411714.00 1.03 15.23 0.426 0.088
1.36 -15959264.00 0.91 26.00 0.479 0.076
1 .27 -37342663.00 0.78 26.00 0.577 0.065
DEBT/EQUITY RATIO! 0.20
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3.17 17078ii80.00 2700 ~57io o 7318 o7l 67
2.72 149306776.00 1.88 4,11 0.325 0.156
2.38 126373344.00 1 .74 4.57 0.333 0.1442.12 103439916.00 1 .61 5.12 0.343 0.132
1.90 80506494.00 1 .47 5.88 0.356 0. 120
1,73 57573068.00 1.34 6.96 0.373 0.108
1,59 34639642.00 1.20 8.75 0.397 0.097
1 .47 11706206.00 1,07 12.83 0.432 0.085
1 .36 -11227218.00 0.93 26.00 0.489 0.073
1.27 -34176994.00 0.80 26.00 0.599 0,061
DEBT/EQUITY RATIO! 0.25
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3.17 174155896.00 2.02 3.80 0.318 0.166
2.72 152630708.00 1 .90 4.09 0.325 0.155
2.38 129363540.00 1 .76 4.54 0.333 0. 143
*?, 12 106096388.00 1 .62 5.09 0,343 0. 131
1.90 82829218.00 1 .49 5.84 0.356 0.119
1,73 59562054.00 1.35 6.91 0.374 0.108
1 .59 36294892.00 1.21 8,66 0.398 0.096
1 .47 13027726.00 1 .08 12.53 0.433 0.084
1 .36 -10239434.00 0.94 26.00 0.491 0.072
T 1929 135
1.27 -33523872.00 0.80 26.00 0.603 0,061
DEBT/EQUITY RATIO: 0.33
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3.17 179428220.00 2.06 3.79 0.319 0.165
2.72 157823084.00 1.93 4.06 0.325 0.154
2.38 134033092.00 1.79 4,51 0.334 0.142
2.12 110243100.00 1.65 5.05 0.344 0.130
1.90 86453110.00 1.51 5.79 0.357 0.118
1 .73 62663120.00 1 .37 6.84 0.375 0.107
1.39 38873120.00 1.23 8.52 0.399 0.095
1 .47 15083128.00 1.09 12.09 0.435 0.083
1 .36 -8706864.00 0.95 26.00 0.495 0.071
1 .27 -32515624.00 0.81 26.00 0.611 0.060
DEBT/EQUITY RATIOJ 0.50
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3.17 188662980.00 2.11 3.77 0.319 0.163
2.72 166883248.00 1.98 4.02 0.326 0.152
2.38 142176820.00 1.84 4.46 0.334 0.140
2.12 117470392.00 1 ,69 4.98 0.345 0.129
1 .90 92763966.00 1 .55 5.72 0.358 0.117
1.73 68057546.00 1 .40 6.72 0.376 0.105
1 .59 43351120.00 1 .26 8.31 0.401 0.093
1.47 18644696.00 1.11 11 .52 0.439 0.081
1 .36 -6061728.00 0.96 26.00 0.501 0.069
1 .27 -30789712.00 0.82 26.00 0.623 0.058
DEBT/EQUITY RATIO: 2.00
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3.17 233106940,00 2.37 3,72 0.321 0. 155
2.72 209978416.00 2.24 3.87 0.328 0.145
2.38 180851096.00 2.06 4.28 0.337 0.133
2.12 151723784.00 1 .89 4.77 0.348 0 . 122
1 .90 122596480,00 1 .72 5.43 0.363 0.110
1 .73 93469166.00 1 .55 6,31 0.383 0.098
1.59 64341856.00 1 .38 7.63 0.411 0.086
1.47 35214548.00 1 .21 9.94 0.453 0,074
1.36 6087230.00 1 .04 16.93 0.527 0.062
1.27 -23078048.00 0.86 26.00 0.686 0.051
DEBT/EQUITY RATIO: 3.00
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3.17 246344572.00 2745 3.71 0.322 0.153
o 7? 222682220.00 2.31 3.84 0.329 0. 143
2. 38 192235288.00 2.13 4.23 0.338 0. 132
2.12 161788380.00 1 .95 4.72 0.349 0.120
1.90 131341464.00 1.77 5.36 0.364 0.1081.73 100894548.00 1 .59 6.22 0.384 0.096
1 .59 70447636.00 1.41 7.50 0.413 0.084
1 .47 40000720.00 1 .24 9.68 0.457 0.0731 .36 9553802.00 1 .06 15.51 0.535 0.061
1 .27 -20936906.00 0.88 26.00 0.706 0.049
DEBT/EQUITY RATIO: 4.00
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3.17 254823520.00 2.50 3.70 0.322 0. 1522.72 23079.3120.00 2.36 3.82 0.329 0. 1422.38 199500372.00 2.17 4.21 0.338 0. 1312.12 168207648.00 1 .99 4.70 0.350 0.1191 .90 136914912.00 1.81 5.32 0.365 0.107
T 1929 136
1 .73 105622176.00 1 .62 6.17 0.385 0.095
1 .59 74329444.00 1.44 7.42 0.415 0.083
1.47 43036708.00 1.25 9.53 0.460 0.072
1.36 11743980.00 1.07 14.85 0.540 0.060
1.27 -19596502.00 0.88 26.00 0.718 0.048
DEBT/EQUITY RATIO*. 4. 99
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3.17 260641884.00 2.53 3.70 0.323 0. 151
2.72 236347992.00 2.39 3.80 0.329 0.142
2.38 204474592.00 2.20 4.19 0.339 0.130
2.12 172601204.00 2 .02 4.68 0.350 0.118
1 .90 140727804.00 1 .83 5.30 0.365 0 . 106
1 .73 108854408.00 1 .64 6.13 0.386 0,094
1 .59 76981018.00 1.45 7.37 0.416 0.083
1.47 45107620.00 1.27 9.44 0.462 0.071
1.36 13234220.00 1 .08 14.49 0.543 0.059
1.27 -18689728.00 0.89 26.00 0.726 0.048
DEBT/EQUITY RATIO* ALL DEBT
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3.17 293095512.00 2«72 3,67 0.324 0.147
2»72 267187496.00 2.57 3.74 0.331 0.138
2.38 232071872,00 2.37 4.11 0.340 0.126
2.12 196956256.00 2.16 4,58 0.352 0.115
1 ,90 161840640.00 1 .95 5.18 0.368 0. 103
1 .73 126725020.00 1 .75 5.97 0.390 0.091
1 .59 91609400,00 1 .54 7.14 0,421 0,079
1 .47 56493784.00 1 .33 9.00 0.471 0.067
1 .36 21378166,00 1,13 13.07 0.561 0.056
1 .27 -15623532.00 0.91 26,00 0.775 0.045
CASE FOUR - VARIATION IN CAPITAL RECOVERY
DEPLETION/RESERVE J20.00 %
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3,17 149276540.00 1 .88 4.75 0.470 0.239
2 ♦ 72 131626804.00 1.77 5.01 0.477 0.222
2.38 109531696.00 1.64 5.61 0.486 0.203
2.12 87436604.00 1 .51 6.37 0.497 0.184
1.90 65341514.00 1.38 7.41 0.511 0.165
1 .73 43246414.00 1.25 8.98 0.529 0.146
1 .59 21151320.00 1.12 11.95 0.556 0.127
1 .47 -943772.00 0.99 26,00 0.596 0.108
1 .36 -23038870.00 0.86 26.00 0.663 0.090
1 .27 -45166732.00 0.73 26.00 0.803 0.071
DEPLETION/RESERVE !30<.00 %
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3.17 169279716.00 2.00 4.36 0.420 0.2132.72 150076116.00 1 .88 4.61 0.427 0.197
2.38 126427448.00 1.74 5.11 0.436 0.181
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2.12 102778800.00 1.60 5.77 0.447 0.164
1.90 79130150.00 1.47 6«66 0.461 0.148
1.73 55481488.00 1.33 7.93 0.479 0.131
1.59 31832836.00 1.19 10.12 0.506 0. 115
1.47 8184178.00 1 .05 15.73 0.546 0.098
1,36 -15464476.00 0,91 26.00 0.613 0.082
1.27 -39144185,00 0.77 26.00 0.753 0.066
DEPLETION/RESERVE 140.00 7.
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3.17 189282600.00 2.11 4.01 0.370 0.186
2.72 168525432.00 1.99 4.25 0.377 0.1732.38 143323216.00 1.84 4.71 0.386 0.159
2 . 12 118121004.00 1.69 5.29 0.397 0. 145
1.90 92918782.00 1 .55 6.04 0.411 0.131
1 .73 67716564.00 1 .40 7.13 0.429 0.116
1.59 42514348.00 1 .25 8.86 0.456 0 . 102
1.47 17312132.00 1 . 10 12.48 0.496 0.088
1 .36 -7890088.00 0.95 26.00 0.563 0.074
1 .27 -33121638.00 0.81 26.00 0.703 0.060
DEPLETION/RESERVE J60.00 7.
R/C NPV FI PBACK ETR TRR
37l7 229288364.00 2735 ~37il o T270 0. 132
2.72 205424064.00 2.21 3.70 0.277 0. 124
2.38 177114732.00 2.04 4.06 0.286 0.1152,12 148805388.00 1 .88 4.54 0.297 0.105
1 .90 120496052.00 1 .71 5.14 0.311 0.096
1 .73 92186714.00 1 .54 5.97 0.329 0.086
1.59 63877376.00 1 .38 7.21 0.356 0.077
1 .47 35568038.00 1.21 9.35 0.396 0.068
1.36 7258694.00 1 .04 15.49 0.463 0.058
1.27 -21079672.00 0,88 26.00 0.603 0.049
DEPLETION/RESERVE 570.00 %
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3.17 249291252.00 2.47 3.29 0.220 0 . 106
2.72 223873384.00 2.32 3.47 0.227 0.100
2.38 194010488.00 2.14 3.81 0.236 0.093
2.12 164147592.00 1 .97 4.24 0.247 0.086
1 .90 134284688.00 1.79 4.80 0.261 0.079
1.73 104421788.00 1.61 5.55 0.279 0.071
1.59 74558884.00 1 .44 6.62 0.306 0.064
1 .47 44695988.00 1 .26 8.41 0.346 0.057
1 .36 14833084.00 1 .09 12.56 0.413 0.050
1.27 -15085058.00 0.91 26.00 0.553 0.044
DEPLETION/RESERVE 580.00 7.
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3.17 269294120.00 2.58 3.10 0.170 0.07972 242322700.00 2.43 3.27 0.177 0.075
2.38 210906244.00 2.24 3.59 0.186 0.071
2.12 179489792.00 2.06 3.97 0.197 0.066
1.90 148073324.00 1 .87 4.50 0.211 0.061
1 .73 116656860.00 1 .69 5.16 0.229 0.057
1 .59 85240398.00 1.50 6 . 12 0.256 0.052
1 .47 53515394.00 1 .31 7.69 0.296 0.047
1 .36 20770814.00 1 .12 11.18 0.363 0.043
1 .27 -12857010.00 0.92 26.00 0,503 0.041
DEPLET ION/RESERVE 111 .00 7. 
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
T 1929 138
3.17 145487800.00 1.86 4.83 0.474 0.243
2.72 130944880.00 1.77 5.04 0.471 0.221
2.38 111956908.00 1.66 5.55 0.468 0.1982 . 12 92968934.00 1 .55 6.16 0.464 0.174
1 .90 73980966.00 1 .44 6.96 0.459 0.150
1 .73 54992996.00 1 .32 8.08 0,452 0. 127
1 .59 36005026.00 1.21 9.78 0.442 0. 103
1,47 17011238.00 1 .10 12.96 0.427 0.080
1 .36 -2378180.00 0.99 26.00 0.401 0.060
1 .27 -23074524.00 0.86 26.00 0.349 0.047
CASE FIVE - VARIATION IN INCOME TAX RATE
INCOME tax rate: 0 .35
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3. 17 234179120.00 2.38 3.47 0.245 0. 123
2,72 210629088.00 2,24 3.63 0.252 0.116
2.38 181542980.00 2.07 3.98 0.261 0.108
2.12 152456856.00 1 .90 4.47 0.272 0.100
1.90 123370736.00 1.73 5.06 0.286 0.091
1.73 94284618.00 1.55 5.90 0,304 0.083
1.59 65198498.00 1 .38 7.14 0.331 0.075
1 .47 36112384.00 1.21 9.30 0.371 0.066
1 .36 7026258.00 1.04 15,65 0.438 0.058
1.27 -22079860.00 0.87 26.00 0.578 0.050
INCOME TAX r a t e : 0. 40
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3.17 225881240.00 2.33 3.56 0.270 0.135
2.72 202744312.00 2.19 3.73 0.277 0.127
2.38 174434980,00 2.03 4.11 0.286 0,117
2,12 146125632.00 1.86 4.60 0.297 0.108
1.90 117816292.00 1.69 5.22 0.311 0.099
1.73 89506956.00 1,53 6,08 0.329 0.089
1 .59 61197618.00 1 .36 7.39 0,356 0.080
1.47 32888280.00 1.19 9.69 0.396 0.070
1.36 4578938,00 1,03 17.27 0.463 0.061
1 .27 -23753256.00 0.86 26.00 0.603 0.052
INCOME tax rate: 0 .45
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3. 17 217583360.00 2.28 3,65 0.295 0.147n yri 194859524.00 2.15 3.83 0.302 0. 138
2.38 167326980.00 1.98 4.23 0.311 0.127
2.12 139794420.00 1.82 4.74 0.322 0.117
1 .90 112261856.00 1.66 5.39 0.336 0 . 106
1 .73 84729292.00 1 .50 6.29 0.354 0.095
t . 59 57196740.00 1 .34 7.65 0.381 0.085
1 .47 29664184.00 1 .17 10. 12 0. 421 0.074
1.36 2131620,00 1 .01 19.82 0.488 0.063
1 .27 -25426646,00 0.85 26.00 0.628 0.053
I N C O M E  t a x  r a t e : 0 . 5 5
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R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3.17 200987616.00 2.18 3.85 0.345 0.171
2.72 179089964.00 2.05 4.07 0.352 0.160
2.38 153110976.00 1,90 4.51 0.361 0.1472.12 127131972.00 1.75 5.03 0.372 0.134
1 .90 101152968.00 1.60 5.75 0.386 0.121
1.73 75173982.00 1.44 6.73 0.404 0.1081.59 49194978.00 1.29 8.25 0.431 0.095
1.47 23215980.00 1.14 11.16 0.471 0.082
1.36 -2763008.00 0.98 26,00 0.538 0.069
1.27 -28773432.00 0.83 26.00 0.678 0.056
INCOME t a x r a t e ; 0 .,60 l
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3.17 192689732.00 2.13 3.95 0.370 0.1832. 7'? 171205188.00 2.01 4.20 0.377 0. 170
2.38 146002972.00 1.86 4,65 0.386 0. 1562.12 120800752.00 1.71 5.20 0.397 0. 142
1 .90 95598538.00 1,56 5.93 0.411 0.128
1.73 70396320.00 1.41 6.97 0.429 0.114
1.59 45194102.00 1 .27 8.60 0.456 0. 100
1.47 19991884.00 1 .12 11 .81 0.496 0.085
1 .36 -5210328.00 0.97 26.00 0.563 0.071
1.27 -30446828.00 0.82 26.00 0.703 0,057
INCOME t a x r a t e ; o'.,65
R/C NPV PI PBACK ETR TRR
3.17 184391852.00 2.08 4.07 0.395 0, 195
2.72 163320396.00 1 .96 4.35 0.402 0.181
2.38 138894968.00 1 .82 4.80 0.411 0.1662.12 114469532.00 1 .67 5.39 0.422 0. 151
1 .90 90044094.00 1.53 6.15 0.436 0. 135
1.73 65618658.00 1 .39 7.25 0.454 0. 120
1 .59 41193224.00 1 .24 8.97 0.481 0. 104
1.47 16767790.00 1 .10 12.58 0.521 0.089
1 .36 -7657644.00 0.95 26.00 0 * 588 0.074
1.27 -32120222.00 0.81 26.00 0.728 0.059
STOP
END OF EXECUTION
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